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CRACKING DOWN ON JUVENILES: THE
CHANGING IDEOLOGY OF YOUTH
CORRECTIONS
MARTIN L. FORST*
MARTHA-ELIN BLOMQUIST*
Juvenile justice policymakers have embarked on a precari-
ous course. For the past fifteen years, they have changed in
fundamental ways the system's philosophy, structure, and pro-
cedures. These changes have serious implications for the justi-
fications underlying the existence of a separate system for
juveniles and its availability to youthful offenders.
This article explores two areas of change in the legal
framework of the juvenile justice system that have affected the
juvenile court's ability to handle youths charged with criminal
behavior. One set of changes involves removing serious juve-
nile offenders' from the juvenile justice system through waiver
or transfer for prosecution in criminal court. The other set of
changes has made the sanctions imposed by juvenile justice
system officials more punitive.
To provide a context for understanding these changes, the
authors offer a brief review of the original philosophy of the
juvenile justice system, followed by a summary of the criticisms
of the system that have led to recent reforms. Details are then
presented of four reform strategies used by legislators across
the country to give social protection and just deserts higher
priorities in policies governing the handling of youthful offend-
ers. These strategies include: 1) easing the process and
grounds for waiving youths to criminal court; 2) incorporating
punishment, offender accountability, or public protection into
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1. Although widely used in both statutes and in the juvenile justice
literature, the term "serious juvenile offender" remains vague and appears to
have no clear or universal definition. For discussion of the need for greater
clarity in defining the serious juvenile offender, see generally Armstrong and
Altschuler, Conflicting Trends in Juvenile Sanctioning: Divergent Strategies in the
Handling of the Serious Youthfid Offender, 33 Juv. & FAM. CT.J. 15 (1982). See
also Fagan & Hartstone, Strategic Planning in Juvenile Justice-Defining the
Toughest Kids, in VIOLENr JUVENILE OFFENDERS (R. Mathias, P. DeMuro & R.
Allinson eds. 1984).
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the purpose clauses of state codes governing the juvenile court;
3) administering juvenile court sanctions based on a system of
determinate sentencing; and 4) imposing mandatory minimum
periods of confinement on youthful offenders adjudicated for
specified serious crimes.
The article concludes by considering the effects of these
reforms. They appear to expose youthful offenders to new bur-
dens and limited opportunities for completing their education
and development. Considered as well are the implications of
these reforms for the broader set of legal and social policies
society uses to regulate youths and to facilitate their transition
from childhood to adulthood.
I. ORIGINAL PHILOSOPHY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
Since the late nineteenth century, the juvenile justice sys-
tem in this country has rested on a philosophy of rehabilitation
and individualized justice.' Under the rehabilitative or treat-
ment model, the state's charge was to act in the best interests of
the child, whether the youth before the juvenile court was con-
sidered dependent or delinquent.
The juvenile justice system was the product of efforts by
Progressive reformers at the turn of the century to change the
way children were treated by the legal system.3 Specifically, the
Progressives envisioned a separate system ofjustice which took
cognizance of their belief that juveniles were different from
adults and needed to be protected, nurtured, and treated,
rather than held completely responsible and punished for their
wrongdoing. Underlying the Progressives' reform agenda was
the assumption that minors were not fully formed-physically
or mentally-and needed to complete their cognitive, social,
and moral development before being expected to shoulder the
burdens of adulthood. It was the state's responsibility-
through the enactment of child labor laws, compulsory educa-
2. For general reviews of the history of the juvenile court, see E.
RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS-AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT
(1978); S. SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE &THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT (1977); A. PLATr,
THE CILD SAVERS (1977); Fox,Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective,
22 STAN. L. REv. 1187 (1970).
3. On the role of the Progressives in juvenile justice reform, see
generally R. MENNEL, THORNS & THISTLES: JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1825-1940 (1973);J. ADDAMS, THE SPIRIT OF YOUTH AND THE
Crrv STREETS (1909); J. Ho.L, JUVENILE REFORM IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA
(1971); Schlossman & Wallach, The Crime of Precocious Sexuality: Female
Delinquency in the Progressive Era, 48 HAgv. ED. REV. 65 (1978); A. PLATr, supra
note 2; S. SCHLOSSMAN, supra note 2.
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tion, and the juvenile court-to ensure that juveniles com-
pleted this development. Furthermore, their socialization
process was to be supervised by professional educators and,
when necessary, by social workers and treatment experts.
By invoking the doctrine of parens patriae-that is, the
responsibility of the state to care for persons who are unable to
care for themselves or whose families are unable to care for
them4-juvenile court judges were given the authority to assert
the state's guardianship over youthful offenders. Rather than
subjecting juveniles to the rigors of the criminal trial or the
harsh conditions of prisons and jails used to house adult
offenders, juvenile court judges were to act benevolently and
protectively toward the minor. In the words of one of the pio-
neers of the juvenile court, Judge Julian Mack, it was the obli-
gation of the judge when assessing a juvenile offender
to find out what he is physically, mentally, and morally,
and then, if. .. [the judge] learns he is treading the path
that leads to criminality, to take him in charge, not so
much to punish as to reform, not to degrade but to uplift,
not to crush but to develop, not to make him a criminal
but a worthy citizen.5
Because youths, almost by definition, were impulsive yet
malleable, the Progressives asserted they were not completely
responsible for acts of wrongdoing. They should not be held
liable in the way the criminal law holds adults liable, because
they had not yet achieved the cognitive or moral maturity asso-
ciated with adulthood. Moreover, the Progressives believed
that the causes of crime did not lie within the will of the individ-
ual-especially not within an individual whose moral code was
only partially formed. Rather, they believed the causes of
crime came from the broader social environment-the neigh-
borhood, the family, and the specific childrearing practices of
parents. Delinquency was viewed as an illness brought on by
the social diseases of poverty, parental neglect, ignorance, and
urban decay.6
The sentencing structure proposed by the Progressives for
the juvenile justice system was a logical extension of the under-
4. For a review of the history of the parens patriae doctrine as the legal
authority for the juvenile court, see Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery
to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C.L. REV. 205 (197 1); Cogan,Juvenile Law, Before and
After the Entrance of "Parens Patriae, " 22 S.C.L. REv. 147 (1970).
5. Mack, The Juvenile Court as a Legal Institution, in PREVENTIVE
TREATMENT OF NEGLECTED CHILDREN 297 (H. Hart ed. 1910).
6. See generally W. HEALY, THE INDIVIDUAL DELINQUENr (1924); A. FINK,
CAUSES OF CRIME (1938).
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lying philosophy that delinquency was an illness the state could
cure by providing individual and expert attention to the unique
circumstances attending each delinquent youth's situation. To
take account of variations in the causes and cures of delin-
quency, state juvenile codes gave juvenile justice personnel-judges, probation officers, training school officials, and parole
boards-broad discretion in the control they could exercise
over a young offender. Juveniles could be wards of the court or
the juvenile correctional system for an indeterminate period up
to the age of majority, which typically ranged from eighteen to
twenty-one years. Whether under probation supervision in the
community or confined in a state-level institution, each youth's
'progress" in receiving treatment and training would be care-
fully monitored to determine, on an individual basis, whether
they were ready for release into the community or discharge
from state supervision.
In more recent discussions of the jurisprudence of youth,
legal scholars have given the assumptions underlying the sepa-
rate system ofjustice for juveniles a modern gloss. Policies on
driving, the employment of minors, compulsory education, vot-
ing, drinking and so forth are based in part on the recognition
that individuals in their youth possess incomplete reason and
maturity. In this view, juveniles continue to require the protec-
tive intervention of the state.
In creating adolescence as a distinct life phase, modern
society has provided youths with opportunities gradually to
increase their freedoms and responsibilities. Especially in their
mid to late teens, juveniles begin to assume the privileges and
burdens associated with adulthood. As a status of semi-auton-
omy, adolescence serves to facilitate an individual's transition
from the total dependency, immaturity, and nonresponsibility
of childhood to the full independence, maturity, and responsi-
bility of being an adult. Franklin Zimring has likened the status
of adolescence to that of a "learner's permit" for adulthood.7
On the one hand, the idea of a learner's permit represents a
continuing belief that youths are different from adults in signif-
icant ways-they are less experienced, knowledgeable, judi-
cious, or appreciative of the consequences of their behavior.
On the other hand, the learner's permit concept suggests that
adolescents, in engaging in activities that require judgment,
decisionmaking, and responsibility--e.g., working part-time,
7. See F. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 89-96
(1982). For a history of adolescence in America, see J. KErr, RITES OF
PASSAGE: ADOLESCENCE IN AMERICA, 1790 TO THE PRESENT (1977).
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driving a car, voting, joining the military-are taking steps that
bring them closer to adulthood. Through these steps, young
people acquire the ability to handle both the privileges and
burdens of full independence.
The theory of adolescence that underlies many of our con-
temporary regulatory policies towards youth and serves as an
updated version of the justifications Progressives proffered for
having a separate system of correctional interventions for
youths asserts that adolescents, by virtue of a few more years of
life experience with exercising reason and independent judg-
ment, are more mature than their younger counterparts. At the
same time, they have yet to obtain the full complement ofjudg-
ment and maturity the legal system attributes to individuals
who have reached the age of majority and who are to be held
fully blameworthy for their acts of wrongdoing. Such a theory
of adolescence implies that youths should continue to be
treated differently from adults, even when by appearance and
behavior, they may seem adult-like. As Zimring suggests:
Equal treatment for wrong-doing seems inappropri-
ate to the transitional status of the learner .... [N]o
learning role is complete without, in some measure,
learning responsibility for conduct. Thus, part of the ini-
tiation into the adult role is building toward adult
responsibilities. Just as the learning theory of adoles-
cence implies a transition toward adulthood, so too it
also implies a progression toward adult levels of respon-
sibility. The adolescent must be protected from the full
burden of adult responsibilities, but pushed along by
degrees toward the moral and legal accountability that we
consider appropriate to adulthood.'
II. MOUNTING CRITICISMS OF THE TRADITIONAL SYSTEM
A. Concerns for Procedural Justice
Although there have been sporadic criticisms of the juve-
nile justice system since its inception at the turn of the cen-
tury,9 extensive and persistent complaints began to surface
starting in the 1960s. Criticisms have been directed at all facets
8. ZIMRING supra note 7, at 95-96.
9. See, e.g., Waite, How Far Can Court Procedure Be Socialized Without
Impairing Individual Rights?, 12J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 339 (1922); Olney,
The Juvenile Courts-A bolish Them, 13 CAL. ST. B.J. 1 (1938); Note, Due Process in
the Juvenile Courts, 2 CATm. U.L. REV. 90 (1952); Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile
Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547 (1957); Allen, The Juvenile Court and the Limits of
Juvenile Justice, 11 WAYNE L. REV. 676 (1965); Welch, Delinquency Proceedings-
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of the system-its underlying philosophy, the practices fol-
lowed by juvenile authorities, and the results of the system's
interventions.
The first wave of criticisms, beginning in the 1960s and
extending into the 1970s, focused largely on the procedural infir-
mities of the juvenile justice court. At that time, empirical
studies on the juvenile system's operations and renewed consti-
tutional challenges to its legal doctrines raised questions about
injustices resulting from the informality of court hearings. The
broad discretionary authority of juvenile justice officials was
specifically attacked. Because the juvenile justice system had
been founded on a theory of benevolent state intervention
intended to protect and help delinquent youths, due process
rights were never considered important. Unlike the situation
of the adult defendant facing trial and punishment for his crim-
inal acts, the youth's relation with the state in a hearing before
the juvenile court judge was deemed to be nonadversarial. The
doctrines of parens patriae and the child's best interests assumed
that the interests of the child were synonymous with the inter-
ests of the state. Children enmeshed in the juvenile justice sys-
tem did not need procedural protections because the
proceedings were civil in nature and the state was attempting
to help or treat them.
Critics began to question the major assumptions underly-
ing the jurisprudence of the juvenile court, and to recognize
the defacto punitive characteristics of the juvenile court's sanc-
tions. A concern for procedural protections in juvenile court
decision processes grew in part as it became more apparent
that in practice the functions of the juvenile justice system
closely resembled those of the criminal justice system-punish-
ment, deterrence, and incapacitation of persons who violated
the criminal law. To the extent that the aims of the juvenile
justice system increasingly approximated those of the criminaljustice system, critics argued that juvenile offenders should be
accorded the procedural safeguards granted to adults.
Moreover, the push for procedural protections came from
people concerned about the injustices that followed from the
broad discretion given to officials in the commitment and
release of juvenile offenders. Research revealed that this broad
discretion resulted in questionable inequalities in the duration
and type of intervention or treatment ordered by juvenile
authorities. Critics of this discretion argued that even if it
Fundamental Fairnas for the Accused in a Quasi-Criminal Forum, 50 MINN. L. REV.
653 (1966).
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could be demonstrated according to scientific standards of
proof that the system rehabilitated youths, the traditional
model of "individualized justice" should be abandoned simply
because of the inequities inherent in it.'0
Attention to the inadequacies ofjuvenile court procedures
was also prompted by concerns for the constitutional rights of
juveniles and for the negative labeling inherent in delinquency
proceedings. Under the "best interests of the child" standard,
the interests of the youth, the family, and the state were
regarded as being mutual. Francis A. Allen was one of the first
to point out the conflicting goals of the juvenile justice system,
and to ask whether the system could do simultaneously what
was in the best interests of the child and the best interests of the
state." Increasingly, observers of the juvenile justice system
said "no," that these two interests frequently conflict.
Legal reformers began to assert that juveniles, like adults,
had.liberty interests that deserved protection when threatened
by the state's coercive powers, regardless of whether such pow-
ers were to be used to help a juvenile offender or to protect the
public. Juveniles did not have the range of liberties adults had
by virtue of their dependence and immaturity. Yet, they had an
interest in protecting their limited freedom from state interven-
tions, especially when such interventions involved coerced dep-
rivation of familiar surroundings and the company of family
and friends. As Justice Fortas noted:
However euphemistic the title, a "receiving home"
or an "industrial school" for juveniles is an institution of
confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a
greater or lesser time. His world becomes, ".. . a build-
ing, with white washed walls, regimented routine and
institutional hours .... " Instead of mother and father
and sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, his
world is peopled by guards, custodians, state employees
and "delinquents" confined with him for anything from
waywardness to rape and homicide.' 2
The juvenile court hearing was intended to focus attention
on the youth's problems as well as to shield the minor from the
10. See, e.g., Arnold, Race and Ethnicity Relative to Other Factors in Juvenile
Court Dispositions, 77 AM.J. Soc. 211 (1971); Scarpitti & Stephenson,Juvenile
Court Dispositions: Factors in the Decision-Making Process, 17 CRIME & DELINQ_.
142 (1971); Wheeler, Juvenile Sentencing and Public Policy: Beyond
Counterdeterrence, 4 POL'y ANALYSIS 33 (1978).
1I. See F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1964).
12. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967).
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stigmatizing effects of the criminal process. However, reform-
ers asserted that the act of wrongdoing that brought the child
to the court's attention should not be ignored. Moreover, in
practice, adjudication in juvenile court for a delinquency peti-
tion--even without the openness of a public trial and the legal
formulas for culpability and evidence--carried negative labels
for the child.
Reforms adopted to address these problems largely
involved the extension of procedural safeguards to juveniles
whenever they were charged with wrongdoing and adjudicated
in the juvenile court.'" The appellate judiciary began a proce-
dural revolution in the late 1960s with the Kent " and Gault 5
cases. Extended through Winship 6 and many other cases, a
multitude of procedural protections were accorded juveniles in
delinquency proceedings. In addition, procedural safeguards
were extended tojuveniles when charged with wrongdoing in a
correctional setting (e.g., violating institutional rules while con-
fined and violating conditions of parole while in the commu-
nity). 7 With a few exceptions (e.g., the right to bail' and jury
trial"9 ), most of the procedural safeguards given adults-as
defendants, prisoners, probationers, or parolees-are now also
accorded to juveniles.20
Some reformers had hoped that by altering the way juve-
nile justice decisions were made, the abuses and unfairness
related to the lack of procedural safeguards could be avoided
without changing the system's underlying rehabilitative philos-
ophy. The majority opinion in the Gault case asserted that
increased procedural formality need not affect the pursuit of
rehabilitation or individualized dispositions based on need.
13. See generally Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the
Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141 (1984).
14. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
15. 387 U.S. 1.
16. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
17. See generally Breed & Voss, Procedural Due Process in the Discipline of
Incarcerated Juveniles, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 641 (1978); Note, Procedural Due
Process for Confined Juveniles, 2 NEw ENG. J. PRISON L. 173 (1976); Gilman,
Developments in Correctional Law, 21 CRIME & DEUNQ. 163 (1975); Note, Post-
Conviction Proceedings Under New York's Juvenile Offender Laws: A Due Process
Critique, 26 N.Y.L. REV. 773 (1981).
18. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
19. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1970).
20. This article will not detail the growth of procedural protections for
juveniles since the late 1960s because that topic has been discussed
extensively in the literature. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 13; Glen,Juvenile Court
Reform: Procedural Process and Substantive Stasis. 1970 Wis. L. REV. 431; Glen,
Developments inJuvenile and Family Court Law, 16 CRIME & DELINQ. 198 (1970).
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The observation of due process standards, intelli-
gently and not ruthlessly administered, will not compel
the state to abandon or displace any of the substantive
benefits of the juvenile process .... The commendable
principles relating to the processing and treatment of
juveniles separately from adults are in no way involved or
affected by the procedural issues . . . Nothing will
require that the conception of the kindly juvenile judge
be replaced by its opposite.
Interestingly, what this line of reasoning meant, in reality, was
that it would be perfectly justifiable, as in the Gault case, to
commit a fifteen-year-old juvenile to a state training school for
a period of up to six years for an offense carrying a sixty-day jail
sentence for adults, as long as the youth was provided with an
attorney and a hearing. 22
However, while not the intent of many proponents of
greater due process for juveniles, procedural reforms did have
a latent impact on the objectives of the juvenile justice system
and its correctional interventions. With the advent of rules,
generalizable standards, and requirements for procedurally
correct decisions, attention began to be focused on substantive
issues such as the equal and fair treatment of offenders rather
than on individualized, situation-specific considerations. As a
result, the offense, rather than the offender, came to be a criti-
cal factor in juvenile court dispositional decisionmaking.
B. Concern for Substantive Justice
The implications of procedural reform for substantive
changes in the philosophy of the juvenile justice system were
welcomed by observers who believed changes more profound
than procedural formalities should be made. The second wave
of criticisms and reforms that emerged in the mid-1970s into
the 1980s was specifically directed at changing the goals and
structure of the system. Demands for overhauling the substan-
tive purposes of the juvenile system came from those who
rejected the very ideal of rehabilitation as well as from those
who supported it as a laudatory goal, but recognized that it
could not be achieved.
Critics taking the former position challenged the rehabili-
tative ideal because it focused almost exclusively on the
problems of offenders and ignored the plight of crime victims
and the community's need for protection. Van den Haag, a
21. In re Gauh, 387 U.S. 1, 21-22, 27 (1967).
22. Id. at 4-9.
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proponent of harsher policies towards youthful offenders,
reflects this perspective by pointing out that "[tihe victim of a
fifteen-year-old muggers [sic] is as much mugged as the victim
of a twenty-year-old mugger, the victim of a fourteen-year-old
murderer or rapist is as dead or as raped as the victim of an
older one. The need for social defense or protection is the
same."
23
Prompted by concerns over rising crime rates and the per-
ception that youths were committing more violent offenses,
law-and-order advocates have been among the most vocal in
complaining that the traditional juvenile sentencing process
has been too lenient, particularly with serious offenders. To
support their demands for substantive reforms, organized
groups of law enforcement personnel and crime victims have
pointed to instances where violent offenders have been
released from institutional placement after being incarcerated
for shorter periods of time than youths committing less serious
crimes. Media sensationalism regarding juvenile crime-par-
ticularly the reporting of brutal or senseless violence by juve-
nile parolees or repeat offenders-contributed to the view that
youth crime was a social problem warranting more stringent
measures of control and coercion. To many, it seemed clear
that policies and interventions associated with a treatment
model had failed to rehabilitate youthful offenders or to pro-
vide adequate public protection. 4
The other set of critics in the camp for substantive reforms
based their challenges on the apparent inability of the juvenile
justice system to fulfill its intended mission of rehabilitation. 2
Because "penny-pinching legislatures" have provided only for
"inadequate facilities, low salaries [and] staff shortages,"026
youths have not been accorded the services and programs they
23. E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS 174 (1975). Cf Boland &
Wilson, Age, Crime, and Punishment, 51 PUB. INTEREST 22 (1978).
24. Although it is difficult to measure, it appears that juvenile crime did
rise significantly between 1960 and 1975. Since 1975, however, the juvenile
crime rate has leveled off or decreased. The perception of a growing juvenile
crime rate since mid-1970s, therefore, is misplaced. See generally Ohlin, The
Future of Juvenile Justice Poli and Research, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 463 (1983);
Galvin & Polk,JuvenileJustice: Time for New Direction?, 29 CRIME & DELIN.. 325
(1983).
25. See, e.g., Lehman, The Medical Model of Treatment, 18 CRIME &
DELIN. 204 (1972); Clark, Legal Policy and the Rehabilitative Reality, 2 OHIO
N.U.L. REV. 231 (1974); Sleeth, A Child is a Child, Except When He's Not.:
California's New Approach to Disposition ofJuvenile and Youthful Offenders, 14 CAL.
W.L. REV. 124 (1978).
26. A. COFFEY, JUVENILE JUSTICE AS A SYSTEM 129 (1974).
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needed for successful rehabilitation. Moreover, some have
suggested that informal procedures, contrary to original intent,
may themselves have constituted a further obstacle to effective
treatment. Rather, it is likely they engendered in the child "a
sense of injustice provoked by seemingly all-powerful and chal-
lengeless exercise of authority by judges and probation
officers."I" Others have pointed out that juvenile dispositions
mandating the youth's separation from the community and
confinement in a secure facility are inherently punitive. Many
of these critics call for the abandonment of treatment as the
primary objective underlying the system's philosophy and
structure in favor of measures to promote just deserts, because
they have accepted the position that "there is little reason to
believe that any effective way to reduce recidivism through
coercive rehabilitation has been found." 9
These broad-based attacks encouraged a re-examination of
the philosophy and structure of the traditional juvenile justice
system. It became necessary to review the conflict of interests
between the constitutional rights of juveniles accused of crime
and the state's responsibility for protecting the community.
Some critics have contended that these conflicting interests
have most often been resolved at the expense of the youth,
while others claim it has been society that has usually suffered.
In either case, the impossibility of satisfactorily balancing these
competing interests has become more apparent. As Kaufman
has stated, "[11n our single-minded determination to 'do good,'
we often failed to take adequate cognizance of the limits of the
law." 30
C. Support for Punitive Policies Towards Youthful Offenders
Reformers have advocated addressing the substantive
inadequacies of the juvenile justice system through proposals
for more punitive and less discretionary control measures.
Their reform proposals have focused on holding youths
accountable for their conduct, emphasizing incarceration as a
primary crime control strategy, and limiting the options offi-
27. PRESIDENT's COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 85
(1967).
28. See Empey, Juvenile Justice Reform: Diversion, Due Process, and
Deinstitutionalization, in PRISONERS IN AMERICA 35-36 (L. Ohlin ed. 1973).
29. Schuhz & Cohen, Isolationism in Juvenile Court Jurisprudence, in
PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE CHIL3 39 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1976).
30. Kaufman, Protecting the Rights of Minors: On Juvenile Autonomy and
Limits of the Law, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1015, 1016 (1977).
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cials have to sanction young offenders. Some policymakers saw
that these interests could be accomplished by following one of
two courses: (1) removing some classes of youthful offenders
from the juvenile justice system in order to subject them to the
more punitive criminal processes and sanctions of the adult
system, or (2) making the juvenile system itself more punitive
in form and function by changing its underlying philosophy,
goals and dispositions. These two policy courses are, of
course, not mutually exclusive.
Support for the first approach-removing youths from the
juvenile system and handling them instead in the adult sys-
tem-has been given by those who view it as a way of making
the juvenile system available to a smaller but more deserving
number of juvenile offenders. By limiting the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court to younger juveniles or to juveniles who
commit less serious crimes, some proponents of these meas-
ures hope to preserve the treatment and protection functions
of the juvenile justice system. At the same time, they are
responding to demands for more punitive handling of serious
youthful offenders. Relevant distinctions could be maintained
between the juvenile and adult systems by merely reclassifying
the clientele each would handle so that those who appeared
dangerous received punishment, and those who appeared
needy and immature received treatment and protection. Revi-
sions in the juvenile court's jurisdictional limits and standards
for waiving juveniles have been advocated to promote the
removal of youths from the juvenile court who seemed more
like adults in appearance, behavior, and experience than like
juveniles .3
Such support for transferring youths from the juvenile sys-
tem into the adult system appears to be based in part on a
desire to avoid draining the limited resources of the juvenile
system on offenders who were "lost causes"--older, chronic
offenders who had already received treatment and support
services from the juvenile court, or serious and violent offend-
ers who posed significant and persistent threats to community
safety. Limiting the jurisdiction of the juvenile court has also
been supported by those desiring to avoid having younger, less
criminally sophisticated youths exposed to and adversely
affected by older, more experienced youthful offenders.
31. See, e.g., Wolfgang, Abolish the Juvenile Court System. 2 (10) CAL. LAw.
12 (1982); Feld, Delinquent Careers and Criminal Policy: Just Deserts and the Waiver
Decision, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 195 (1983); Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle
of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRiM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 471 (1987) [hereinafter Feld, Legislative Changes].
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Extending the jurisdiction of the criminal court to encom-
pass youths deemed ill-suited for the juvenile system has been
an attractive strategy for some because it makes possible the
preservation of the distinctive characteristics of the juvenile
justice system as originally envisioned. However, the drawback
to this strategy is that it makes the juvenile justice system
unavailable to the very youths who may be most in need of its
educational and counseling services if they are to avoid a life of
imprisonment. The consequences of handling youths in the
criminal system are discussed later.
The other approach to more punitive policies-changing
the philosophy, goals, and sanctions of the juvenile system-
has been advocated by those wishing to preserve the juvenile
justice system as a separate system by making it more respon-
sive to concerns of public safety, equal justice, and rationality
in decision processes. Backers of this strategy have acknowl-
edged conceptual as well as operational flaws in the original
theory ofparenspatriae and the rhetoric of individualized justice.
However, implicit in the support for reforming these ideals has
been the continuing belief that youths are different from adults
at some level. When the state assumes control over the youth-
ful offender, it has special obligations that do not exist between
the state and the adult offender. While young people may be
subject to the same period and type of restraint as adults, how
they are treated while under state custody--especially with
respect to opportunities for education, vocational training, and
therapeutic counseling-should be qualitatively different. The
preservation of a separate system for juveniles, whatever its
characteristics, is fundamental to this belief.
However, by altering some of the system's fundamental
features, strategies to reform the juvenile justice system from
within may :unwittingly be moving the system closer to obsoles-
cence. To the extent the new juvenile justice policies view the
young offender as being morally and legally responsible, and
state interventions are recognized as being no substitute for
familial care or for the complex of relations and institutions in
the community that socialize young people, the rationale for a
special set of correctional programs and policies is lost. The
consequence of the incongruence of these ideas with thejustifi-
cations for having a separate system of justice for juvenile
offenders will also be considered later.
Notwithstanding their incongruities and untoward effects,
proposals to orient the philosophy and administration of the
juvenile justice system around punishment and public protec-
tion have been supported by a diverse set of scholars,
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lawmakers, and practitioners. The prestigious Joint Commis-
sion on Juvenile Standards of the Institute of Judicial Adminis-
tration and the American Bar Association (IJA/ABA) proposed
in 1980 that the principles of criminal law and procedure
replace the rehabilitative model ofjuvenile justice.32 The Joint
Commission advocated that juvenile justice sanctions be
offense-based rather than based on the needs of the offender
and that determinate sentencing should replace the traditional
indeterminate sentencing system. Moreover, the National
Advisory Committee for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Pre-
vention in its Standards for the Administration ofJuvenileJustice sup-
ported a move to have the offense, as opposed to the needs of
the offender, form the basis of a system of juvenile court
dispositions."
To promote the shift toward an offense-based system of
sanctions, reformers have proposed the adoption of what has
been variously referred to as a justice, punishment, or account-
ability model for the juvenile system. Such ajustice model pro-
vides guidelines and justifications for decisionmaking that are
consistent with the legal and moral principles underlying the
state's police powers and constitutional restraints on that
power. With its emphasis on sanctions proportionate to the
seriousness of the offense and the equal treatment of similarly
situated offenders, the justice model has attracted support from
lawmakers and lobbyists from all positions in the political
spectrum.
For example, the justice model has been supported by
some children's rights advocates because it recognizes a
youth's right to be punished for the offense committed, rather
than the need to be treated for what others perceive to be
wrong with him.' One attraction of justice based on the
offense rather than on the best interests of the child is that it is
32. See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION/AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION JOINT COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARDS
RELATING TO DISPOSmONS 22-30 (1980). Cf McCarthy, Delinqueny Dispositions
Under the Juvenile Justice Standards: The Consequences of a Change of Rationale, 52
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1093 (1977).
33. See THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITEE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE 337 (1980).
34. See, e.g., Shepherd, Jr., Challenging the Rehabilitative Justification for
Indeterminate Sentencing in the JuvenileJustice System: The Right to Punishment, 21
ST. Louis U.L.J. 12, 33-34 (1977). It should be noted, however, that other
children's rights advocates have taken a different tact in upholding the
traditional rehabilitative focus of juvenile correctional interventions. They
have instead pushed for a constitutional right to treatment-a right that has
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likely to prevent the disproportionate periods of incarceration
permitted under a rehabilitation-oriented system. As Fox has
noted, "punishment clearly implies limits, whereas treatment
does not. '" Under this approach, a youth would not be incar-
cerated longer than is justified by the nature of the delinquent
conduct, and certainly no longer than an adult convicted of the
same offense.
The justice model has also appealed to advocates of vic-
tims' rights and more restrictive crime control measures. Such
a model increases the likelihood that a youthful offender will be
subject to sanctions commensurate with the offense and the
harm caused. Predicated on proportionality, an offense-based
system ofjustice permits greater equality between the sanctions
imposed on adults and those imposed on juveniles adjudicated
for the same crime. A justice model promises to confront
offenders with their wrongdoing, regardless of age, by requir-
ing that they bear the consequences of their criminal behavior.
Proposals for changing the juvenile court's sentencing
structure have accompanied the movement to re-orient the
juvenile justice system's philosophy. These proposals have fea-
tured offense-based models of decisonmaking, 6 and sentenc-
ing guidelines have been advocated as a suitable way to deal
with the problems of discretion and disparity created by the
traditional system of indeterminate sentences and the broad
decision making authority of judges and correctional
personnel.
III. SUBSTANTIVE REFORMS
A. Removing Youths From the Juvenile Justice System
One strategy lawmakers have utilized more extensively in
recent years to deal with serious, chronic, or violent juvenile
offenders is to prosecute them as adults-i.e. to remove them
from the juvenile justice system altogether. This process is
generally known as waiver or transfer.
been recognized by some state and federal courts. See, e.g., Morales v.
Turman, 383 F.Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
35. Fox, The Reform ofJuvenile Justice: The Child's Right to Punishment, 25
JUV. JUST. 2, 4 (1974).
36. See e.g., Becker, Washington State's New Juvenile Code: An Introduction,
14 GONZ. L. REV. 289 (1979); Reich, The Juvenile Justice Act of 1977: A
Prosecutor's Perspective, 14 GONZ. L. REV. 337 (1979).
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1. Background on Waiver Procedures
Most of the early court statutes contained some provision
for waiving jurisdiction. 7  Certain youths, described as
"chronic," "serious," "violent," "sophisticated," "mature," or
"persistent" were thought to be beyond the purview of the
rehabilitative-oriented juvenile court. Early statutes gave the
juvenile court absolute discretion to dismiss a delinquency peti-
tion and to transfer a youth to the criminal justice system."s
Most statutes did not prescribe substantive criteria or proce-
dures for the waiver process, thereby allowing waiver decisions
to be made in an informal and subjective manner, giving unfet-
tered discretion to the juvenile court.39
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court, in Kent v. United
States,40 struck down the arbitrary procedures implicit in the
District of Columbia's waiver provision and held that a juvenile
was entitled to a waiver hearing, representation by counsel,
access to information upon which the waiver decision was
based, and a statement of reasons justifying the waiver deci-
sion. In a non-binding memorandum attached to the opinion
in Kent, the majority set forth several factors a juvenile court
judge might consider in making a waiver decision. However,
the Court has not struck down any waiver legislation containing
such vague phrases as "amenability to treatment," "dangerous-
ness," "protection of the public," "best interests of the public
welfare," or the nature of the youth's "family, school and social
history."
Over the past twenty years, approximately half of the state
legislatures have amended their juvenile codes to simplify or
expedite the waiver of juveniles to criminal court for trial as
adults.4 . State legislatures have redefined criteria for the age
limit ofjuvenile jurisdiction and changed the assignment of dis-
cretionary authority for determining the court before which
certain types of juvenile cases will appear.
Removing a youth from juvenile court jurisdiction can be
accomplished in one of three primary ways: judicial waiver,
legislative waiver, and prosecutorial waiver. While most states
continue to permit the judge to make the waiver decision, some
37. See generally Whitebread & Batey, The Role of Waiver in Juvenile Court:
Questions of Philosophy and Function, in MAJOR ISSUES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE
INFORMATION AND TRAINING: READINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY 207-26 U. Hall, D.
Hamparian, J. Pettibone & J. White eds. 1981) [hereinafter MAJOR ISSUES].
38. See Feld, Legislative Changes, note 31, at 478.
39. Id.
40. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
41. See Feld, Legislative Changes note 31, at 504.
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jurisdictions have changed their waiver procedures to vest
authority for transfer in the hands of the legislature or the
prosecutor. The differences in these approaches to reforming
waiver policies and making the juvenile court unavailable to
categories of youthful offenders are described below.
2. Judicial Waiver
In all but a few states, statutes empower a juvenile court
judge to decide, with varying degrees of statutory guidance,
whether to transfer certain juveniles charged with specified
offenses to adult court for prosecution.42 The judicial decision
to waive a youth to criminal court recognizes that for certain
offenses or offenders, juvenile justice system sanctions may,
because of jurisdictional limitations, be insufficient to meet the
needs of the public and the offender. Waiver statutes assume,
moreover, that some youths are simply beyond rehabilitation,
that is, unamenable to treatment in the juvenile justice system.
As Rudman and others have pointed out, waiver is itself a
severe sanction, with potentially harsh consequences, including
extended detention in jail, a protracted adjudicatory process, a
felony conviction resulting in social and legal sanctions, and a
lengthy sentence at a secure correctional institution.4 3 Accord-
ingly, the waiver decision does more than determine a judicial
forum for an accused youth. It invokes a jurisprudential philos-
ophy that governs the nature of the proceedings as well as the
purpose and severity of the sanctions. It also raises the impor-
tant issues of when a child is no longer a child and what factors,
other than age, are relevant for removing some youths from
juvenile court jurisdiction.
Waiver by the juvenile court judge remains the primary
mechanism for referring a youth to criminal court. The judge
must identify those juvenile offenders amenable to the rehabili-
tative efforts of the juvenile justice system and those whose
behaviors require the punitive sanction of the criminal justice
system. However, irrespective of the Kent memorandum and
the descriptive criteria found in the majority of statutory provi-
sions on judicial waiver, broad discretion still surrounds the
judicial waiver decision."
42. Id.
43. See Rudman, Hartstone, Fagan & Moore, Violent Youth in Adult Court.:
Process and Punishment, 32 CRIME & DEUNQ. 75 (1986) [hereinafter Rudman,
Discretionary Waiver].
44. See generaUy Wizner, Discretionary Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction:
An Invitation to Procedural Arbitrariness, 3 CRIM. JUST. EmHics 41 (1984).
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3. Legislative Waiver
A newer approach to prosecuting juveniles as adults, and
one that circumvents the juvenile court altogether, is legislative
waiver, also known as excluded offense provisions. One strat-
egy to accomplish the removal of offenders from the juvenile
court is for the legislature simply to lower the age of criminal
court jurisdiction. The other strategy, the more common one,
is for the legislature to specify those offenses for which a juve-
nile may not be adjudicated in juvenile court.
New York's 1978 legislative change is one example of the
latter type of legislative waiver. The Juvenile Offender Law
provided that the criminal court is to have original jurisdiction
in cases of thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen-year-olds charged
with specified serious offenses. 4 5 The legislation also estab-
lished a presumptive length of stay in secure confinement,
although the periods of incarceration are not as long as those
authorized for adults convicted of the same offense.
It is important to note that this form of waiver can be used
in conjunction with traditional judicial waiver. For example,
Georgia's legislative waiver provisions establish original crimi-
nal court jurisdiction for juveniles fifteen years of age and older
charged with burglary and having three prior adjudications for
burglary.46 .For other offenses, the juvenile court judge in
Georgia retains jurisdiction to waive juveniles to criminal court.
Other states have also combined legislative and judicial waiver.
In a special legislative session in 1981, Vermont modified its
waiver laws to require the criminal court to have original juris-
diction over fourteen and fifteen-year-olds who have been
charged with specified crimes.4 7 Moreover, Vermont's new law
provides that children aged ten through thirteen may be prose-
cuted as adults.
Recent reforms in California's waiver procedures also
combine traditional judicial discretion with a legislated pre-
sumption of unfitness established by age and offense. Youths
sixteen years of age and older may be found by the juvenile
court judge to be unamenable for juvenile court intervention
45. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.00(2) (McKinney 1987). For discussion see
McGarrell, Change in New York's Juvenile Corrections System, 1 CRIM. JusT. POL'Y
REV. 169 (1986); Woods, New York's Juvenile Offender Law: An Overview and
Analysis, 9 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (1980); Note, Rehabilitation vs. Punishment: A
Comparative Analysis of theJuvenilejustice Systems in Massachusetts and New York, 21
SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1091 (1987).
46. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-39.1 (1990).
47. See generally Note, The Serious Young Offender Under Vermont's Juvenile
Law: Beyond the Reach of Parea Patrice, 8 VT. L. REV. 173 (1983).
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based on the judge's consideration of enumerated facts.48
These factors include the minor's delinquent history, previous
attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor, the cir-
cumstances and gravity of the offense charged, whether the
minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juve-
nile court's jurisdiction, and the degree of criminal sophistica-
tion exhibited by the minor.
In addition, and as a result of a 1976 statutory revision
made to expedite the transfer of older, serious youthful offend-
ers, a presumption of unfitness favoring waiver was added to the
California law.49 Under this new section, youths sixteen and
older charged with specified offenses are presumed to be unfit
subjects for the juvenile system because of the charged offense
and age. The list of offenses includes murder, plus various
classifications of arson, rape and other sexual offenses, kidnap,
assault, and drug-related crimes.5' However, under this provi-
sion, a youth may rebut the presumption with evidence indicat-
ing she would "be amenable to the care, treatment, and
traininI program available through the facilities of the juvenile
court.-
4. Prosecutorial Waiver
Prosecutorial waiver (also known as concurrent jurisdic-
tion or direct filing) is another approach to circumventing juve-
nile court jurisdiction. This strategy authorizes the
prosecuting attorney to file either in juvenile court or directly
in criminal court. Statutes permitting direct filing often pro-
vide some restrictions or guidelines, such as a combination of
the alleged offense, age of the juvenile, and whether the youth
has had prior adjudications in juvenile court.
Nebraska is one state that has historically used this method
of prosecuting serious juvenile offenders in adult court.
Nebraska's law provides that the county attorney (district attor-
ney) has discretion to file in juvenile court or in the municipal
or district (criminal) courts in three types of cases: ajuvenile of
any age alleged to have committed a felony, a juvenile sixteen
or seventeen alleged to have committed a misdemeanor or
infraction, or a juvenile of any age alleged to have committed a
48. See CAL. WEL?. & INST. CODE § 707(a) (West 1984).
49. See Gadbois & Black, 1976 Amendments to theJuvenile Court Law: Adult
Treatment of 16-17 Year-Old Offenders, 9 U. WEST L.A. L. REv. 13, 22 (1977).
50. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(b) (West 1984).
51. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(a) (West 1984).
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traffic offense.5" This statutory scheme, therefore, encom-
passes all serious juvenile criminality.
As with legislative waiver, some states combine both judi-
cial waiver and direct prosecutorial filing. In 1967, for exam-
ple, Colorado enacted a law permitting prosecutors to file
directly on juveniles sixteen and seventeen years of age
charged with an offense that, if committed by an adult, could
result in a sentence of life imprisonment or death.5 3 In 1973
the Colorado legislature broadened the direct filing provision
to include youths over sixteen years of age charged with certain
felonies and youths who, in the previous two years, had been
adjudicated for a felony offense.
Florida passed a law in 1981 that permits the state's attor-
ney to file a criminal complaint on sixteen and seventeen-year-
olds when the public interest requires the consideration of
adult sanctions.' 4 This applies to felonies as well as to misde-
meanors preceded by two delinquency adjudications, one of
which must have been a felony. Also in 1981, Utah revised its
waiver statutes. Current provisions retain judicial waiver for
most cases but provide for direct criminal court filing for some
offenses.55
It should be noted that both legislative and prosecutorial
waiver statutes commonly permit the criminal court judge to
send the juvenile offender back to the juvenile court for adjudi-
cation if the juvenile is deemed not to be a fit candidate for the
criminal justice system. This process is typically called "reverse
waiver."
B. Changes in the Juvenile Justice System's Philosophy and Goals
By the end of the 1970s, lawmakers began to respond to
calls for harsher measures against juvenile crime by altering the
espoused purposes and administration of the juvenile court
and youth correctional systems. As Feld has documented, in
the past decade at least ten states have modified the purpose
provisions of the juvenile court by de-emphasizing rehabilita-
tion and introducing or stressing community protection and
52. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-274 (1988).
53. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-104(4)(c) (1986). For a discussion, see
Note, The Expanding Scope of Prosecutorial Discretion in ChargingJuveniles As Adults:
A Critical Look at People v. Thorpe, 54 U. CoLo. L. REV. 617, 618-21 (1983).
54. See FLA. STAT. § 39.09(2)(e) (1981). For a discussion, see Carter,
Chapter 39, The Florida Juvenile Justice Act: From Juvenile to Adult with the Stroke of
a Pen, 11 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 921 (1984).
55. See generally Norman & Gillespie, Changing Horses: Utah's Shift in
Adjudicating Serious Juvenile Offenders, 12 J. CoNTEMP. L. 85 (1986).
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punishment."6 Two pre-eminent examples of this philosophi-
cal change are Washington and California.
In passing the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, Washington
became the first state to enact a determinate sentencing statute
for juvenile offenders. Mary Kay Becker, principal sponsor of
the bill, said of the new statute:
[Tlhe broad purposes of [the bill] should be fairly clear.
In terms of the philosophical polarities that have charac-
terized the juvenile court debate for more than a century,
the new law moves away from the parens patriae doctrine
of benevolent coercion, and closer to a more classical
emphasis on justice. The law requires the court to deal
more consistently with youngsters who commit offenses.
The responsibility of providing service to youngsters
whose behavior, while troublesome, is noncriminal, is
assigned to the Department of Social and Health Services
and the agencies with whom it may contact. The juvenile
court is to view itself primarily as an instrument ofjustice
rather than as a provider of services.5 8
This dramatic philosophical change is also demonstrated
in the specific objectives of the new legislation; which included
(1) making "the juvenile offender accountable for his or her
criminal behavior," and (2) providing "punishment commensu-
rate with the age, crime, and criminal history of the juvenile
offender." 59 The requirement of commensurate punishment
creates the foundation for a determinate sentencing system for
juveniles in Washington, which we shall discuss below.
The California legislature has also made a number of sig-
nificant changes in the codes pertaining to the philosophy and
operation of the juvenile court. Statutory revisions enacted in
the past ten years have made accountability, victims' rights, and
public safety high priorities of the juvenile justice system. The
current statement of purpose for the juvenile court reads in
part:
T .. 'he purpose of the [Arnold-Kennick Juvenile Court
Law] is to provide for the protection and safety of the
public and each minor under the jurisdiction of the juve-
nile court .... Minors under the jurisdiction of the juve-
nile court as a consequence of delinquent conduct shall,
56. See Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment,
Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U.L. REV. 821, 844 (1988).
57. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.010 (West Supp. 1990).
58. Becker, supra note 36, at 308.
59. WASH. REV. CODE, § 13.40.010(2)(c)-(d) (West Supp. 1990).
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in conformity with the interests of public safety and pro-
tection, receive care, treatment and guidance which is
consistent with their best interest, which holds them
accountable for their behavior, and which is appropriate
for their circumstances. This guidance may include pun-
ishment . . . . As used in this chapter, "punishment"
means the imposition of sanctions which include the
following:
(1) Payment of a fine by the minor.
(2) Rendering of compulsory service without com-
pensation performed for the benefit of the com-
munity by the minor.
(3) Limitations on the minor's liberty imposed as a
condition of probation or parole.
(4) Commitment of the minor to a local detention
or treatment facility, such as a juvenile hall,
camp, or ranch.
(5) Commitment of the minor to the Department of
the Youth Authority. "Punishment," for the
purposes of this chapter, does not include
retribution.'
The California legislature has also specified the factors a
juvenile court judge is to consider when choosing an appropri-
ate disposition for the youthful offender. Included in the pro-
vision on selecting a disposition are the minor's age, the
cireumstances and gravity of the offense, and the minor's previ-
ous delinquent history.6 ' While these factors are only broadly
stated and include no guidance as to how they are to be
weighted or assessed, they draw the judge's attention to mat-
ters related to the youth's criminal conduct and not to her
needs.
In addition, the administrative policies instituted by cor-
rectional officials in the California Youth Authority (CYA) sys-
tem have also begun to focus on the goals of accountability and
public protection. In the comprehensive statement of mission
and directions issued by the Department of the Youth Author-
ity in 1983, the Director declared that "the most effective way
to protect the public is to ensure that offenders are held
accountable for their antisocial behavior." 2 According to this
policy document, accountability "refers to the ward accepting
60. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (West Supp. 1989).
61. Id., at § 725.5.
62. DEPARTMENT OF THE YouTr AUTHORITY, MISSION STATEMENT,
PREMISES, EXPANDED DIRECTIONAL STATEMENTS 5 (1983).
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fidl responsibility for his or her own behavior, including the com-
mitment offense and behavior while in the institution and on
parole."6 The Department has construed its charge to hold
offenders responsible for their delinquent conduct as a man-
date to have youths address the effects of their behavior on
victims.
The Youth Authority embraces victim assistance as an
essential means of making government more responsive
and sensitive to the consequences of criminal behavior.
The Department will work on ... [delivering] increased
services to victims .... These services will include resti-
tution, public service work projects, and resource sharing
efforts which emphasize the offender's accountability for
his offense .... Benefits of [these efforts] include.., the
enhancement of public protection, assistance in alleviat-
ing the loss and suffering of the victims of crime,
increases in wards' sense of responsibility for past acts,
and promotion of values which help youthful offenders
become law-abiding citizens. 64
In addition, in the California youth correctional system,
the Youthful Offender Parole Board (YOPB) is responsible for
setting the specific term of confinement to be served by CYA
wards within legislatively and judicially prescribed maximas.
Since the early 1980s, the YOPB has made holding youthful
offenders accountable its top priority and the major factor in
decisions concerning release.
C. Reforms in the Juvenile Justice System's Dispositional Structure
Several states have revised the internal structure of their
juvenile justice systems, particularly commitment and release
decisionmaking, to be compatible with the philosophical
changes mentioned earlier. To re-orient the administration of
sanctions within the juvenile system, policymakers have fol-
lowed two major strategies: they have instituted determinate
sentencing or sentencing guidelines, and they have imposed
mandatory sanctions, such as a minimum period of confine-
ment or restitution on youths adjudicated for specified
offenses.
63. Id (emphasis added).
64. Id at 17.
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1. Background on Determinate Sentencing
A careful review of the scholarly literature reveals that the
term "determinate sentencing" has no precise or uniform defi-
nition either in law or in common usage.65 For some it has sim-
ply been used interchangeably with "flat-time sentencing,"
which means that a trial court judge metes out a specific sen-
tence which cannot be modified by a parole board or other cor-
rectional authority. To others, it has meant eliminating the
authority given to a parole board or a juvenile corrections
agency for discretionary releases and replacing it with legisla-
tively derived sentencing standards which are to be imposed by
the juvenile court.
However, von Hirsch and Hanrahan have suggested a
more encompassing definition of determinate sentencing that
includes the following elements: (a) a presumptive sentence
(or narrow range), (b) normally based on the commitment
offense (as opposed to the needs of the offender), and (c) set
either at the time of sentencing or shortly after the penalty has
been imposed.6 Once the specific adjudication offense has
been assessed, it is possible to determine fairly accurately the
length of the offender's stay in an institution. Other factors can
be added to the sentencing formula besides the commitment
offense, such as prior offense history and age. But based on
this definition, it is possible for a parole board or a juvenile
correctional agency to administer a determinate sentencing sys-
tem for juveniles. Moreover, the specific structure of a deter-
minate sentencing scheme can use either a specific presumptive
sentence or a narrow range.
As mentioned in the previous discussion of philosophical
changes, the first state in the country to enact a determinate
sentencing statute forjuveniles was Washington in 1977. Com-
prehensive sentencing standards, the result of a cooperative
effort between the state legislature and a sentencing commis-
sion, make u the core of Washington's determinate sentenc-
ing system.67 Initially, the legislature established broad
offense-related dispositional and durational standards based on
65. See generally Goodstein, Kramer, & Nuss, Defining Determinacy:
Components of the Sentencing Process Ensuring Equity and Release Certainty, 1 JUST.
Q. 47 (1984); Forst, Fisher & Coates, indeterminate and Determinate Sentencing of
Juvenile Delinquents: A National Survey of Approaches to Commitment and Release
Decision-Making, 36(2) Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 1 (1985); Dershowitz, Indeterminate
Confinements: Letting the Therapy Fit the Hann', 123 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (1974).
66. See von Hirsch & Hanrahan, Determinate Penalty Systems in America, 27
CRIME & DkULNQ. 289, 294 (1981).
67. See generally Becker, supra note 36.
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the youth's commitment offense, criminal history and age.
After setting forth the appropriate standards to be followed in
general terms, the legislature then created the Juvenile Disposi-
tion Standards Commission to develop specific guidelines for
judges.
The Commission identified various factors in the
offender's record associated with the commitment offense and
criminal history that were to be assigned particular numerical
scores. Based on a youth's adjudicated offense and history, she
would achieve a specific point total. The standards relate the
various score totals to specific mandatory dispositions and
durational periods of probation, community services, or incar-
ceration in a state training school. Prior to sentencing, court
personnel calculate the youth's points. The juvenile court
judge then imposes the "presumptive sentence" indicated in
the guidelines. For sanctions involving incarceration, the
guidelines provide a relatively narrow range for the term of
confinement for each point total. For example, if an offender
scores between 250 and 299 points, the judge commits the
youth to the juvenile training school for a period of fifty-two to
sixty-five weeks. Within this durational range, the correctional
authorities set the actual length of stay and release date.
It should be noted that the Washington legislature pro-
vided an "escape clause" for the juvenile court judge in the
application of the sentencing guidelines. There is a provision
in the law which authorizes the juvenile court judge to sentence
the youth outside the appropriate guidelines.6" If the court
considers aggravating and mitigating circumstances and finds
that sentencing the youth within the guideline ranges would
cause a "manifest injustice"'69 to the youth or to society, it may
sentence the youth outside the established guidelines. When
the judge invokes the manifest injustice clause, she must set
forth written reasons, and the youth has a right to appeal the
dispositional order.
California has adopted a different strategy in moving
toward determinacy in sentencing juvenile offenders.
Prompted by the California Supreme Court's ruling in People v.
Olivas 7o to extend the equal protection of the law to the term of
confinement served by youthful offenders committed to the
California Youth Authority, the legislature modified the inde-
terminate sentencing law applicable tojuveniles. As part of the
68. See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.160 (West Supp. 1990).
69. Id. at 13.40.160(1).
70. People v. Olivas, 17 Cal.3d 236, 551 P.2d 375 (1976).
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major reform package adopted in 1976 which affected several
aspects of the juvenile justice system, including the transfer
provisions described above, legislators enacted that
In any case in which the minor is removed from the phys-
ical custody of his parent or guardian as the result of an
order of wardship... [based on sustaining the charge of
a criminal offense], the order shall specify that the minor
may not be held in physical confinement for a period in
excess of the maximum term of imprisonment which
could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense
or offenses which brought or continued the minor under
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.7
When ordering the commitment of a juvenile to the Cali-
fornia Youth Authority, the juvenile court judge must now
specify the offense or offenses for which the youth is being con-
fined, and the maximum available confinement time permitted
for the -offense. The maximum term relates to California's
determinate sentencing law for adults, which specifies a lower,
middle, and upper term for each felony. In calculating the time
to be served in confinement for multiple offenses, juvenile
court judges must follow the rules on setting consecutive and
current terms as specified in the California Penal Code and the
Rules of Court for adults.72
While the current statutory framework establishes maxi-
mum confinement terms for juveniles based on sentences set
forth in the Penal Code, the Youthful Offender Parole Board
(YOPB) has the discretion to order release prior to the expira-
tion of this term.7 Out of concern for equality and propor-
tionality, the legislature applied the maximums to provide
youths the protection of limits on confinement associated with
the offense rather than treatment .needs. Lawmakers expect
that the YOPB will release most wards before the end of the
maximum term.
While the legislature was fashioning these new parameters
on sentencing for both adults and juveniles, the YOPB began
to develop an elaborate set of administrative policies to govern
release decisionmaking and to promote the rational exercise of
its lawful discretion on this matter. These policies were for-
mally organized into a set of parole release standards referred
to as Parole Consideration Date Guidelines. As a policy state-
71. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 726(c) (West 1984).
72. See generally R. HOLLER, THE DETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW IN
JUvENILE COURT (1978).
73. Set CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1766(a),(b) (West 1984).
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ment, the guidelines were created to balance concerns for pub-
lic safety, fair treatment of the offender, and justice to the
victim.
The guidelines are offense-based and contain several dis-
tinct features. They constitute a form of determinacy in sen-
tencing by associating each commitment offense with a
presumptive term of confinement. All crimes are placed into
one of seven categories, each of which is assigned a presump-
tive parole consideration date which is proportionate to the
seriousness of the offenses listed in the category. The guide-
lines specify the composition of the hearing panel authorized to
set release dates and relate hearing panels to offense catego-
ries. Generally speaking, the more serious the offense and the
higher the offense category (with Category 1 including the
most serious offenses such as murder, kidnap and rape, and
Category 7 the least serious such as technical violations of
parole conditions), the larger the number of hearing officers
who must participate in determining the release date.
Once a ward has been placed at a Youth Authority recep-
tion clinic and has been evaluated through a series of diagnos-
tic tests, clinic staff schedule the youth for an initial appearance
before a Board panel. The tentative designation made by staff
for the ward's offense category and hearing panel size is then
confirmed or altered by the hearing officers at this initial
appearance. The hearing panel also determines the parole
consideration date, at which time the youth can reasonably
expect to be released. Once set at this first hearing, the parole
consideration date can be modified at the youth's annual
review or intermediary progress review hearings. At such sub-
sequent hearings, the Board panel may consider a variety of
factors to justify shortening or extending the term. These fac-
tors include how the ward "has dealt with her commitment
offense," her attitude, her behavior while confined, her partici-
pation in programs ordered by the parole board, and her will-
ingness to acknowledge responsibility for her crime. If there
are no modifications, the youth is released on her parole con-
sideration date, which may have been set months or years
before.
Other examples of determinate sentencing schemes within
the juvenile court appear more draconian. For example, in
1987 the Texas legislature passed an act aimed at thirteen and
fourteen-year-old serious juvenile offenders.7 4 This law pro-
vides that juveniles who have been adjudicated for one of six
74. See generally Dawson, The Third Justice System: The New Juvenile-
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enumerated crimes may receive a determinate sentence as long
as thirty years in confinement. The youth is to serve her sen-
tence in the juvenile correctional system until the age of eight-
een, at which time the offender may be transferred to the adult
correctional system to serve out the remainder of her sentence.
2. Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Statutes
Some states have passed what amount to mandatory sen-
tencing laws for serious delinquents, often referred to as "seri-
ous delinquent statutes." These laws mandate that a subset of
delinquents (usually statutorily labeled as "serious," "violent,"
''repeat," or "habitual") be adjudicated and committed in a
specific manner different from other committed delinquents.
These youths are subject to adjudication in juvenile court (as
opposed to waiver to adult court), but they receive commit-
ments which may vary significantly from the type given other
adjudicated delinquents.
One example of this strategy is New York's Designated
Felony Law, which was part of the Juvenile Justice Reform of
1976."5 This law provided that violent juvenile offenders
remain in juvenile court (Family Court), but required harsher
penalties for fourteen and fifteen-year-olds adjudicated for
specified crimes. Another example of mandatory minimum
sentencing can be found in Illinois' Juvenile Law. In 1984, the
Illinois legislature enacted the Habitual Juvenile Offender Act,
which provides that habitual juvenile offenders be subject to
mandatory confinement in a youth correctional facility until the
age of twenty-one.7
6
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE CRACK DOWN
Many of the reforms discussed above have been imple-
mented so recently that it has not been possible to evaluate
them thoroughly. Moreover, the studies that have been con-
ducted often suffer from methodological problems that make
valid comparisons difficult. Nevertheless, the move to crack
Cnminal System of Determinate Sentencing for the Youthful Violent Offender in Texas,
19 ST. MARY's LJ. 943 (1988).
75. For a discussion of the Designated Felony Law, see Woods, supra
note 45.
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 705-12 (1983 & Supp. 1984) (The
Habitual Juvenile Defender Act was originally part of the Juvenile Court Act
of 1965. This Act was replaced with theJuvenile Court Act of 1987, P.A. 85-
601, so that former paragraph 705-12 is now paragraph 805-35). For a
discussion, see Note, Mandatory Sentencing for HabitualJuvenile Offenders: People
v.J.A., 34 DE PAUL L. REV. 1089 (1985).
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down on serious juvenile offenders appears to be having signif-
icant consequences-for the youths subject to harsher sanc-
tions as well as for the youth correctional system as a whole.
This discussion considers, first, the effects of reforms in waiver
laws, and then some of the consequences of reforms making
the juvenile justice system more punitive.
A. Waiver
Revisions in waiver statutes have had somewhat mixed
results. A couple of studies have shown that juveniles prose-
cuted as adults are treated more leniently than they would have
been if they had remained in juvenile court. Most juvenile
offenders considered for waiver have prior delinquency adjudi-
cations and are viewed as the most serious and dangerous
offenders coming before a juvenile court-judge. However,
when these youths are waived to criminal court, they appear
before a judge for the first time in an adult judicial setting.
Compared to hardened adult criminal, these juveniles are per-
ceived as relatively minor offenders. As a result, the criminal
justice system in some jurisdictions appears to treat transferred
juvenile offenders relatively benignly."" This phenomenon has
been called the "leniency gap" for juvenile offenders in crimi-
nal court.78
On the other hand, most studies suggest that juvenile
offenders waived to criminal court face much harsher sanctions
than they would have received if they had been adjudicated in
juvenile court. It is important to emphasize that the term
"sanctions" in this article is not limited simply to case disposi-
tion in court. Sanctions also include the range of attendant
consequences of criminal prosecution from pretrial detention
to discharge from parole.
In one of the more comprehensive and recent studies of
the consequences of waiver, Rudman and his associates con-
ducted a study of 177 youths considered for transfer in four
cities. 79 A comparison was made between those juveniles
waived to criminal court and those retained in juvenile court.
The researchers found that those youths waived to criminal
court consistently fared less well than comparable youths adju-
dicated in juvenile court. For example, the Rudman study
77. See. e.g., Roysher & Edelman, Treating Juveniles as Adults in New York:
What Does It Mean and How Does It Work? in MAJOR ISSUES, supra note 37, at
265.
78. Rudman, Discretionary Waiver, supra note 43, at 78.
79. Id
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found that on the average it takes 2.5 times longer (246 com-
pared to 98 days) for a youth to be waived, convicted and sen-
tenced in criminal court than to be considered for transfer (but
retained), adjudicated and disposed in juvenile court. In one
site the time differential was over four times longer in criminal
court. This delay has serious implications because the longer
the process takes, the greater the delay in the delivery of serv-
ices for convicted youths.
The Rudman study findings also challenge the idea of a
"leniency gap" for youths convicted and sentenced in criminal
court. The dispositions meted out by the criminal court were
consistently more punitive than the dispositions given by juve-
nile court judges. First, a higher proportion of youths con-
victed in criminal court received some type of incarceration
(prison or jail) than comparable youths sentenced in juvenile
court (90% compared to 77%). Secondly, the length of the
sentence for those incarcerated was approximately five times
longer for youths convicted in criminal court.
Bilchik and Thomas conducted a recent study of the effects
of prosecuting juveniles in the Miami, Florida criminal courts.8 0
Although the comparative aspects of the study are problematic
and the findings mixed, the authors found that the average sen-
tence for juveniles convicted and sentenced to confinement by
the criminal court was approximately four years. This average
sentence can hardly be considered draconian; however, it is in
all probability longer than the term of confinement these
youths would have faced in the juvenile justice system.81
Moreover, an evaluation of the effects of Utah's 1981
waiver revisions found that under the new legislation both the
conviction rate and the severity of sentence increased signifi-
cantly compared to the data on waiver covering a 13-year-
period before the revisions."2 And in a study ofjuveniles pros-
80. See Thomas & Bilchik, Prosecuting Juveniles in Criminal Courts: A Legal
and Empirical Analysis, 76J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 439 (1985). Cf. Bishop,
Frazier & Henretta, Proseculorial Waiver: Case Study of a Questionable Reform, 35
CRIME & DEuNQ. 179 (1989).
81. Current data on length of institutional stay at training schools in
Florida are sketchy. According to one comparative study, the average length
of institutional stay in Florida's training schools in recent years for all
offenses has been between five and six months. This time period is
considerably less than the average of four years in prison for waived youths.
The five to six month figure, however, is for all offense categories; data were
not available for the serious offenses separately. See DEPARTMENT OF THE
YOUTH AtrnHoRTY, POPULATION MANAGEMENT AND FACILITIES MASTER PLAN,
1986-1991 A12 (1983).
82. See Norman & Gillespie, supra note 55, at 97.
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ecuted in Philadelphia's criminal court and a comparable sam-
ple adjudicated in juvenile court, Eigen concluded that
"U]uveniles in adult court are in for hard times.""3
The correctional experiences of juveniles prosecuted in
criminal court have also begun to be studied. For example,
Forst, Fagan and Vivona found that the conditions of imprison-
ment were much harsher for juvenile offenders serving time in
a state prison when measured against a comparable group of
youths who served their incarceration in a juvenile correctional
institution (training school).8" In this study, interviews were
conducted with a sample of youths who had been waived to
criminal court and subsequently sentenced to state prison and
a sample of comparable juvenile offenders who had been
retained in juvenile court and committed to a training school.
Interviews took place approximately two years after placement
in the respective institutions.
The study found that the correctional experiences for
juveniles in prison were consistently less helpful and more
punitive. Specifically, youths in prison reported less staff assist-
ance in helping them to control their violent behavior, improve
their interpersonal relations, achieve personal goals, and pre-
pare them with job skills for their return to the community.
Staff in prison were also reported as providing less help in get-
ting the youths acquainted with institutional rules and proce-
dures, encouraging program participation, providing
counseling, and securing services needed by the youth inmates.
Additionally, the study found that juveniles in prison were sub-
jected to more personal victimization by other prisoners (and
by staff) than the comparable sample in training schools.
Other studies have also shown differences in the ways
juveniles cope in training schools and in prison. One study, for
example, indicated that youths became more violent as part of
their adjustment to the violence that surrounds them in
prison.8 5 Comparable youths in training schools did not face
83. Eigen, The Determinants and Impact of Jurisdictional Transfer in
Philadelphia, in MAJOR ISSUES, supra note 37, at 333.
84. See Forst, Fagan & Vivona, Youth in Prisons and Training Schools:
Perceptions and Consequences of the Treatment-Custody Dichotomy, 40(1) Juv. & FAM.
CT. J. 1 (1989) [hereinafter Forst, Youth in Prisons]. See also MacShane &
Williams, The Prison Adjustment of Juvenile Offenders, 35 CRIME & DEuNQ. 254
(1989).
85. See Eisikovits & Baizerman, "Doin' Time": Violent Youth in a Juvenile
Facility and in an Adult Prison, 6 J. OFFENDER COUNSELING, SERVICES &
REHABILITATION 5 (1983).
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the same problems of violence. They selected different, less
violent, modes of adaptation.
B. Determinate Sentencing
The data are also sketchy concerning the effects of sen-
tencing revisions within the juvenile justice system. However,
existing evidence suggests that, at least in some jurisdictions,
revisions in the juvenile court and correctional system have
resulted in moving the system in the intended direction of
greater punitiveness.
The effects of the Washington revisions are inconclusive,
due primarily to the lack of long-term follow-up studies, but
some findings are noteworthy. Schneider and Schram found
that admissions to training schools and the average daily popu-
lation of training schools initially decreased with the implemen-
tation of the determinate sentencing law.8 6 However, not long
after, admissions reached or exceeded the levels prior to the
reform. When dispositions were classified by general offense
category, marked changes were observed in the severity of
sanctions juvenile court judges imposed under the new sen-
tencing guidelines. Prior to the determinate sentencing law,
38% of the adjudicated violent offenders were committed to a
state facility; after the reforms, this number rose to 92%. A
similar trend was noticed for serious or chronic offenders:
60% were committed to a state facility before the reform, and
87% after.
Evidence of a punitive orientation appeared with non-vio-
lent offenses as well. In a related research project, Schneider
studied the processing and disposition of alcohol and drug
offenders before and after the Washington reforms. She found
that both drug and alcohol offenders received harsher sanc-
tions after the move to the "justice" model than they did under
the rehabilitation model."'
California provides evidence of the most extreme punitive
consequences of juvenile justice reform. One overall evalua-
tion of the juvenile justice system showed that the juvenile
courts and the criminal courts are much more alike than the
statutory language would indicate."8 Judges in both the juve-
86. See Schneider & Schram, The Washington State Juvenile Justice System
Reform: A Review of Findings, 1 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 211 (1986).
87. See Schneider, A Comparative Analysis ofJuvenile Court Responses to Drug
and Alcohol Offenses, 34 CRIME & DELINQ. 103 (1988).
88. See generally Greenwood, Lipson, Abrahamse & Zimring, YouTm
CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA (1983).
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nile court and criminal courts look primarily at the present
offense and prior record in determining disposition. The study
concluded:
The evidence suggests that the juvenile justice system is
becoming increasingly punitive, particularly for the more
serious offenders. Between 1978 and 1981 the number
of juveniles placed in secure county facilities jumped by
23% while CYA placements increased by more than
10%. All of this is occurring at the same time that arrest
rates for most crime categories are either leveling off or
declining.8 9
In recent years, more punitive statutory and administrative
policies for youthful offenders and political pressure to hold
juveniles accountable have created a perverse situation for the
young person sent to the California Department of the Youth
Authority. By virtue of her status as a youth and her amenabil-
ity to efforts at reform,9° the delinquent minor is committed to
the Youth Authority (YA). Yet, once there, she is told she will
be held fully responsible for her behavior and is liable for the
maximum term of confinement applicable to adults convicted
of the same offense. Indeed, as a result of the operation of the
Youthful Offender Parole Board's release guidelines, youthful
offenders in California are in some respects held more respon-
sible for their wrongdoing than adults who commit the same
crime.
Statistics on lengths of stay in 1987 indicated that YA
wards on average served longer terms of confinement than
adults sentenced to prison for the same offense. In a compari-
son with inmates of the California Department of Corrections
(CDC) for fourteen categories of serious felony offenses, YA
Department officials found that YA wards served 28.5 months
of confinement overall while CDC prisoners served only 23.6
months. Specifically, in eleven out of the fourteen offenses, YA
wards served as much or more time as their adult inmate coun-
terparts. Only in the category of murder was there a notable
difference in the direction of longer terms of confinement for
adults sentenced to prison.9 '
89. Id. at 151.
90. By law, acceptance of a commitment from the juvenile court by the
Youth Authority is predicated on a finding that the youth would be amenable
to the treatment and training efforts of the Department. See CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE, §§ 707(a), 707(b), 707.2, 734, 1731.5(b) (West 1984).
91. The statistics for these comparisons included:
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Recent changes in the Youthful Offender Parole Board's
policies on release and its use of discretion to modify terms of
confinement reflect greater reliance on incarceration as the
method for holding youthful offenders accountable. Since the
parole board adopted the Parole Consideration Date Guide-
lines, it has lengthened the presumptive terms for several of
the offense categories. Originally viewed as the maximum
average time wards would serve, the presumptive dates set
forth in the guidelines for each category are now treated by
board members as the minimum term wards are to serve for
their commitment offenses. Moreover, in exercising their
authority to deviate from the presumptive terms and to modify
the terms once a ward has begun to serve her time, hearing
officers in recent years have consistently used their discretion
to impose an upward rather than a downward deviation from
the presumptive terms. To the extent rehabilitation has played
a role in the YOPB's release decisionmaking, it has been in the
direction of extending a ward's length of stay in order to have
the youth participate in another program. At the same time,
many of the specialized programs offered in YA facilities have
become increasingly unavailable to youths because of inade-
quate resources and bedspace to accommodate the growing
number of wards being ordered into the programs. Yet, failure
to enroll in a Board-ordered program results in an extension of a
ward's parole consideration date.
C. Other Consequences
Two other consequences are worthy of brief mention.
First, the crack down on juvenile crime has substantially
affected the number of juveniles placed in state training
LENGTH OF STAY
CYA WARDS CDC INMATES
Manslaughter 45.3 months 38.3 months
Burglary 26.5 months 22.7 months
Theft 24.1 months 16.6 months
Drugs 23.5 months 18.1 months
For first and second degree murder, CDC inmates served 167.7 and 103.2
months respectively, while CYA wards served 70.9 and 66.7 months. See
INFORMATION SYSTEMS, DEPARTMENT OF THE YOUTH AUTHORrTY, MEMORAN-
DUM TO YOUTH AND ADULT CORRECTIONAL AGENCY (Aug. 3, 1988) (unpub-
lished memorandum). A prior study in 1983 on relative lengths of stay
served by YA wards and CDC inmates indicated that youths were confined for
shorter periods than adults. See CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURT LAW REVISION
COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 7, 24 (1984).
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schools. Children in Custody reports that in 1987 there were
more children in state juvenile facilities than at any time since
that survey started in 1971.92 Moreover, the rate per 100,000
of juveniles in custody increased from 185 in 1985 to 208 in
1987. This increase, it is important to note, was not due to an
increase in the juvenile population which in fact is declining.
Another noteworthy fact is that although there has been an
overall increase in the number of juveniles in training schools
in the country, there has actually been an eight percent
decrease in the number held for serious and violent offenses.93
That seeming anomaly can be accounted for by two facts: first,
the juvenile courts are using incarceration with increasing fre-
quency for less serious juvenile offenders, and second, more
serious offenders are being waived to criminal court. As Kris-
berg has noted, "[tihere are no current national statistics on
the extent of these transfers; however, the number of persons
under eighteen admitted to adult prisons increased from 1,445
in 1981 to nearly 4,000 in 1983."9'
Again, California presents the extreme example of the
impact of the get-tough philosophy on a state's juvenile correc-
tional system. The tougher policies of the YOPB have caused
the overall length of stay for YA wards to climb steadily since
1978. Increased terms of confinement have had dramatic
impacts on the size of the institutionalized population,
demands for programs, resources, and staff.95 In 1979, the
Youth Authority had an institutionalized population of 4,955
wards with an average length of stay 11.6 months. By 1989,
that population had increased to 8,500 wards with an average
length of stay of 25.4 months. For every month the Board has
increased the average length of stay for YA wards, there has
been an increase in the incarcerated population of nearly 500
wards, or the equivalent of an entire institution.96
92. See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION,
CHILDREN IN CUSTODY 1 (1988) [hereinafter CHILDREN IN CUSTODY].
93. Id. at 3.
94. Krisberg, Violent Juvenile Offenders: The Treatment of Violent Juvenile
Offenders, 11 (1) NEWSLETTER, Division of Child, Youth and Family Services,
American Psychological Association, Division 37 1 (1988).
95. Commitment rates have remained remarkably stable for the Youth
Authority in recent years, so the increase in population is due to the parole
board's release decisions. See generally THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE'S BLUE
RIBBON COMMISSION ON INMATE POPULATION MANAGEMENT, FINAL REPORT
(1990) [hereinafter BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION]; Department of the Youth
Authority, SELECTED STATISTICS ON THE CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 1980 THROUGH 1986 (1988).
96. See CALIFORNIA SENATE OFFICE OF RESEARCH, OVERCROWDING IN
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Youth Authority facilities have not kept pace with the num-
bers; the current population is being housed in facilities
designed to hold 6,400 wards. Studies have documented some
of the deleterious conditions that have resulted from operating
the Youth Authority at 141% capacity. Crowding has reduced
administrative staff flexibility in program planning and place-
ment so that incompatible wards are housed together because
of bedspace constraints.97 Moreover, assaults have increased
in YA facilities during the past ten years as crowding has wors-
ened. Statistics indicate the assault rate nearly doubled from
12.8 per 100 Average Daily Population (ADP) in 1978 to 24.3
per 100 in 1986.98 In addition, the number of grievances filed
by wards and the number of disciplinary actions taken by staff
have increased as a result of crowding.9
While the Department's own research has shown that
smaller, more highly staffed units are associated with positive,
nonviolent, and nondelinquent social relations"° (behavior
that parole board members ostensibly look for when consider-
ing a ward's "readiness" for release), it has been unable to pro-
vide the environment to promote this therapeutic milieu.
Moreover, as the institutional population size has increased,
YA staff time has become devoted to managing violence in the
institutions and to warehousing wards. The emphasis in the
allocation of resources has shifted from traditional programs to
hardware for security and workers' compensation due to stress-
related disabilities. This reliance on institutionalization in Cali-
fornia has led to the highest juvenile custody rate of any state in
the country.' 0 California's juvenile custody rate of 498 per
100,000 is over twice the national average of 208.
Aside from increases in institutional population, the sec-
ond issue of interest is the effect of the get-tough ideology on
recidivism. Unfortunately, good recidivism studies are notice-
ably absent in the literature, particularly as they relate to a
comparison of approaches to juvenile justice, i.e., studies of
punitive- versus rehabilitative-oriented systems, or pre-post
THE CALIFORNIA YOUTH AUTorrY: AN ASSESSMENT OF CASES AND EFFECTS X(1982) [hereinafter OVERCROWDINGJ.
97. See id at XIV.
98. See BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION, supra note 95 at 38.
99. OVERCROWDING, supra note 96 at 81-83.
100. See id. See also C. McEWEN, DESIGNING CORRECTIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS FOR YOUTHS: DILEMMAS OF SUBCULTURAL DEVELOPMENT 90
(1978); Ray and Wandersman, The Impact of Density in a Juvenile Correctional
Institution: Research, Recommendations, and Policy Implications, 4 EVALUATION &
PROGRAM PLANNING 185, 189-90 (1981).
101. See CHILDREN IN CUSTODY, supra note 92, at 6.
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studies of major statutory reforms. Only one good study exists
in this vein. Schneider provides data comparing the recidivism
rates before and after the juvenile justice reforms in Washing-
ton state.0'0 In essence, she found that there was no difference
in recidivism after the change to a "justice" model.
While correctional officials in California have used longer
terms of incarceration both to hold youthful offenders account-
able and to offer greater security to the public, recidivism rates
do not suggest that offenders are more law-abiding as a result
of these efforts. The CYA's recidivism rate increased from
44.5% in 1978 to 58.4% by 1985.03 Additional carefully con-
structed recidivism studies should be conducted in the future
to evaluate more thoroughly these juvenile justice reforms.
V. IMPLICATIONS
The preceding description paints a picture of a juvenile
justice system that is radically different from the one conceived
and constructed by its founders. Gone are the informality, the
paternalism, and the pretense of benevolence.
For most observers, the transformation that has occurred
over the past twenty-five years is, with some exceptions, a wel-
come change. "Reformers" of all ideological and political per-
suasions find some satisfaction in policy changes that promote
"fairness" and "equity." Children's rights advocates have
found solace in reforms that provide greater procedural pro-
tections to juveniles facing a deprivation of liberty. They laud
revisions that have reduced the capricious and discriminatory
aspects of indeterminate sentencing. But as Fox observed over
15 years ago: "The demise of treatment in favor of a right to
punishment will find few mourners in the conservative
ranks. ' ° Thus, victims' rights and public protection advo-
cates find comfort in reforms that put more serious offenders
behind bars for longer periods of time, whether those bars are
in a prison or a training school. In fact, it is this curious polit-
ical coalition of "reformers" that has enabled the sweeping
changes described in this article to take place.
Yet, the move to accountability (and punishment) in juve-
nile justice has profound implications for the continued viabil-
ity of the juvenile justice system. Given that the procedural
102. See Schneider, Sentencing Guidelines and Recidivism Rates of Juvenile
Ofenders, I JUST. Q 107 (1984).
103. See BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION, supra note 95 at 40.
104. Fox. The Reform ofJuvenileJustice: The Child's Right to Punishment, 25
Juv. JUST. 2, 4 (1974).
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safeguards in juvenile court are fundamentally the same as
those in criminal court (except for bail and trial), that the
espoused goals (justice and public protection) are essentially
the same, and that the sanctions meted out approximate (or
even exceed) those of the criminal justice system, the central
question becomes: Why have a separate juvenile justice
system?
Indeed, some scholars have concluded that since the reha-
bilitative ideal has been dismantled,' 05 the juvenile justice sys-
tem itself should-to a greater or lesser degree-be abolished.
Some seek simply to eliminate juvenile court jurisdiction over a
specified subset of delinquent youths based on the offense."°
Others want to focus on the age of the juvenile offender.
Boland and Wilson, for example, call for an end to the "two-
track" system of justice (one for adults and one for juveniles),
at least for serious juvenile offenders who, they believe, should
be treated as adults.107 Another popular proposal is to lower
the age limit ofjuvenile (and criminal) court jurisdiction. Wolf-
gang, for example, advocates placing all persons 16 years or
older who commit crimes under the jurisdiction of the adult
criminal courts.' 08 Van den Haag has a similar approach, only
more sweeping: "After age thirteen, juveniles should be
treated as adults for indictment, trial and sentencing
purposes." 09
The authors of this article believe that calls for the aboli-
tion of the juvenile court are dangerous in the extreme and
constitute an overreaction to the problem of serious juvenile
crime. We believe that the juvenile court should be retained
for three basic reasons: 1) as a practical matter the punitive
treatment ofjuvenile offenders may do society more harm than
good; 2) differential treatment of juveniles is consistent with
the underlying jurisprudence of criminal responsibility; and 3)
imposing the burdens of adulthood only in selected areas (or
without granting the concomitant privileges of adulthood) is
morally questionable.
105. See generally Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative Reform and the Serious
Young Offender: Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal", 65 MINN. L. REv. 167
(1981).
106. See, e.g., Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 31, at 471.
107. See Boland & Wilson, supra note 23.
108. See Wolfgang, supra note 31, at 12-13.
109. See van den Haag, supra note 23, at 249.
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A. The Questionable Effwacy of Punitive Sanctions
Committing juvenile offenders to long periods of incarcer-
ation, or placing them in an adult prison, has an inherent
appeal to those wanting to protect the community and uphold
victims' rights. The attraction of this strategy follows, in part,
from the belief that harsh sanctions will deter youthful offend-
ers from future criminal activity. For example, Alfred Regnery,
former Administrator of the Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, has stated that "juvenile justice pro-
fessionals should consider ... reducing the traditional distinc-
tion between juveniles and adults," and that "the deterrent
approach should be the main focus of the [juvenile] justice sys-
tem.,,' 0 At the least, the "get-tough" approach is designed to
incapacitate selected juvenile offenders for limited periods so
that they are unable to victimize the community. As Van den
Haag notes, "[t]he need for social defense or protection is the
same" whether the persons victimizing the community are
adults or juveniles. " I I
The authors of this article feel this "out of sight, out of
mind" approach is short-sighted. For waiver cases, incarcera-
tion in prison can be particularly destructive to juveniles.
Although there is ample evidence that juvenile facilities are not
the therapeutic communities that some would like to imag-
ine,' 12 they are less violent and destructive than adult prisons.
They are also more likely to provide opportunities for program
participation and personal growth. As the evidence presented
above suggests, when comparing the experiences of juveniles
in prisons to those in training schools, youths in prisons con-
sistently receive less help in programs and personal problem
solving; they are also subject to more personal victimization.
We believe these experiences will not have the desired deter-
rent effect. As Forst, Fagan, and Vivona concluded:
The calculus of transfer policy shown here suggests that
the social benefits in terms of public protection and retri-
bution may be offset by the social costs of imprisoning
transferred youth .... Policy-makers must ask whether
society is at greater risk from youth who spend one to
110. Regnery, Getting Away With Murder- Why the Juvenile Justice System
Needs an Overhaul, 1985 POL'Y REv. 65, 68 (Fall 1985).
111. Van den Haag, supra note 23.
112. See generally S. LERNER, BODILY HARM: THE PATrERN OF FEAR AND
VIOLENCE AT THE CALIFORNIA YouTH AUTHORITY, THE CYA REPORT PART
Two (1986); Poole & Regoli, Violence in Juvenile Institutions, 21 CRIME &
DELXNQ. 213 (1983).
1991]
362 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 5
three years in a system designed to 'treat' them, or from
youth who spend 10-15 years in a system designed to
'punish'."
Except for an extremely small fraction of serious offenders who
may be subject to the death penalty, juveniles sent to prison
will be released back into society at some point. They may then
pose an increased threat to public safety. As Judge Wright stated
in U.S. v. Bland:
There is no denying the fact that we cannot write these
children off forever. Some day they will grow up and at
some point they will have to be freed from incarceration.
We will inevitably hear from the Blands and Kents again,
and the kind of society we have in the years to come will
in no small measure depend on our treatment of them
now.14
Even long periods of confinement in juvenile facilities are
of questionable utility. Although on a lesser scale than prisons,
violence and intimidation also occur in training schools. More-
over, all too often juvenile institutions simply warehouse
youths. The dangers of institutionalization have received con-
siderable attention in the literature regarding mental hospitali-
zation'" or incarceration in prison." 6 The problem of
"prisonization"" 7 also applies to youths in training schools.
Rather than "correcting" personality defects or improper
socialization, prolonged incarceration in training schools can
contribute to further solidification of delinquent values and an
antisocial lifestyle, either in the behavior exhibited inside the
institution or in the community.
The process of prisonization also has implications for
deterrence and recidivism. Although both of these concepts
are extremely difficult to measure and interpret, there is no
reliable evidence that the get-tough juvenile policies have had
their desired deterrent effect by lowering the recidivism rate.
To the contrary, there is evidence that the longer a youth
remains in a training school, the more likely she is to recidivate.
Wheeler, in his study of incarceration and recidivism in a mid-
west juvenile correctional system, concluded that increased
113. Forst, Youth in Prins, supra note 84, at 11-12.
114. U.S. v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wright, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1974).
115. See, e.g., E. GoFEmAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION
OF MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES (1961).
116. See, e.g., D. CLEMMER, THE PRISON COMMUNTY (1966).
117. G. WHEELER, COUNTER-DETERRENCE: A REPORT ON JUVENILE
SENTENCING AND EFFECTS OF PRISONIZATION (1978).
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lengths of stay in training schools functioned as a "counter-
deterrent"' '8-that is, the longer the period of incarceration,
the greater the likelihood of recidivism.
Suffice it to say that the data on recidivism and deterrence
are presently insufficient to make any hard conclusions. For
just that reason, along with Forst, Fagan, and Vivona, we con-
tinue to believe that:
In developing policy for violent delinquents, administra-
tors and legislators should weigh the risks of future crime
and violence from exposure to violence in prison, depri-
vation from the normalizing influences of meaningful
contacts with natural social networks, and unmet treat-
ment or remedial needs.' 9
B. Diminished Capacity and the Juvenile Offender
The philosophical underpinnings of the juvenile court
have always been problematic. American society has been
schizophrenic in its attitudes toward the juvenile offender, as
well as toward the juvenile court. Feelings of compassion and
humanitarianism for juveniles in trouble (particularly those
who cause trouble) have been tinged with fear and vengeance.
The move to transform the jurisprudence and goals of the juve-
nile justice system has at least served one useful function-it
has brought society's ambivalence into the open for discussion
and analysis and caused a soul-searching evaluation of the
nature of the "experiment" launched almost one hundred
years ago.
Yet renewed analysis of the nature and goals of the juve-
nile justice system has, to a great extent, only led to confusion
and continued inconsistencies as to the purposes of a separate
system of justice for juveniles. Terms such as "just deserts,"
"punishment," "retribution," "justice," and "accountability,"
while used in describing changes in juvenile justice, are rarely
defined. They are often used interchangeably, and sometimes
in contradistinction to one another. California, for example,
recently amended its juvenile code to provide that one of the
purposes of the juvenile court sanction is "punishment," but
the new law also states that the punishment inflicted may not
be "retributive" 1 2 0 punishment. This qualification appears to
obscure rather than to clarify the system's objectives. What
kind of punishment is left-so-called therapeutic or humanita-
118. Id.
119. Forst, Youth in Prisons, supra note 84, at 11.
120. CAL. WEtF. & INST. CODE § 202(e)(5) (West Supp. 1990).
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rian punishment? Is it possible, operationally, to distinguish
the administration of therapeutic punishment from retributive
punishment? How is therapeutic punishment different from
rehabilitation?
One way out of this quagmire, we believe, is to return to
some of the basic concepts in legal theory. Underlying the
rhetoric of justice and accountability, and consistent with cen-
turies of legal doctrine, is the key concept of criminal responsi-
bility. The traditional basis of the criminal sanction is to
expose a person who violates the criminal law to the formal and
public moral condemnation of the community.' 2 ' This moral
condemnation follows from the assumption that the criminal,
having free will, knowingly and consciously chooses to violate
the law. Historically, criminal responsibility has been what the
social scientists call a dichotomous variable-that is, the
defendant is either fully responsible for her actions or is not
responsible at all. Traditionally there was no middle ground-
the mens rea requisite for criminal responsibility was either pres-
ent or it was not.
Over time, such dichotomous thinking proved to be incon-
sistent with social reality. The social sciences-as well as centu-
ries of human experience-have shown that there are degrees
of culpability and responsibility. Specifically, the idea of a sin-
gle mens rea began to be tempered by empirical knowledge of
the realities of human life.' Through centuries of legal devel-
opment, increasingly finer gradations in the mental element of
crime have emerged. For example, after reviewing the evolu-
tion of mens rea in Anglo-American law, Sayre asserts:
The conclusion to which one is thus driven is by no
means a negative one. It focuses our thinking upon the
important fact that there is no single precise requisite
state of mind common to all crime .... An intensive
study of the substantive law covering each separate group
becomes necessary to reach an adequate understanding
of the various states of mind requisite for criminality.
The old conception of mens rea must be discarded, and in
its place must be substituted the new conception of mentes
reae. 1
23
One example of the greater understanding of degrees of
the mental element is found in the area of mental illness and
12 1. See Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs.
401, 405 (1958).
122. See generally Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REv. 974 (1931).
123. Id. at 1026.
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the law, and specifically in the criminal responsibility of the
mentally ill. The dichotomous thinking of either sane and
totally responsible or insane and totally nonresponsible has not
squared with modern tenets of psychodynamic psychiatry. The
commentary of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code
recognizes this point when it concludes: "The law must recog-
nize that when there is no black and white it must content itself
with different shades of gray."' 2 4 The fit between formal legal
categories and psychological states of the mentally ill is an issue
that legal and medical professions have been wrestling with for
decades. 125
Criminal law doctrine in some states has accommodated
the complexity of mens rea by incorporating the concept of
diminished capacity.12' Diminished capacity means, in essence,
that because of some mental process, state of mind, or status,
the defendant did not possess the capacity to form the requisite
mental state for the crime charged. The areas in which dimin-
ished capacity has been applied in criminal jurisprudence con-
cern behavior committed under the states of heat of passion,
intoxication, and mental illness.
We believe the concept of diminished capacity should be
incorporated into the jurisprudence of juvenile justice. The
recognition of gradations of responsibility concerning criminal
acts is consistent with modern theories of child development
and psychology. It is also consistent with legal regulations
toward adolescents that provide for the incremental extension
of privileges and obliations based on age, life experience, and
individual maturity.' The notion of diminished capacity to
form specific criminal intent also implies a diminished respon-
sibility or, as one scholar calls it, "partial responsibility."' 28
We propose the term "graduated responsibility" because it
more adequately addresses the problems of artificial abstrac-
tion inherent in the "all-or-nothing" approaches historically
taken to deal with the criminal responsibility of minors.
At common law, a child under age seven was held to be
completely nonresponsible for her criminal acts based on the
124. U.S. v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 618-19 (2d Cir. 1966) (quoting
ALl Model Penal Code, Tent. Drafts, Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4, at 158).
125. See generaUyJ. BIGGS, THE GuiLTY MIND: PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW
oF HOMICIDE (1955); Louisell & Diamond, Law and Psychiatry: Detente, Entente,
or Concomitance?, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 217 (1965).
126. See generally Morse, Diminished Capacity: A Moral and Legal
Conundrum, 2 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY 271 (1979).
127. See Zimring, supra note 7, at 80-86.
128. Morse, supra note 126, at 288.
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defense of infancy. m2 9 However, upon reaching the age of
eight, the child was deemed to be completely responsible.
With the creation of the juvenile court at the turn of the last
century, the Progressives committed a similar empirical and
legal fallacy when they simply pushed the criminal court's juris-
diction up to the age of eighteen. The jurisprudence of the
juvenile court held that all young people coming under its
jurisdiction for an act of delinquency were to be considered
nonresponsible for their actions. It is in large part this legal
fiction of nonresponsibility of juvenile offenders that caused
the juvenile court to lose its credibility in the past twenty years.
A middle ground-such as that of "graduated responsibility"-
which is consistent with notions of criminal responsibility and
current evidence of adolescent development, is necessary to
preserve the integrity of the juvenile court.
To a great extent, the cut-off age between adolescence and
adulthood is arbitrary.' The dividing line is in part a social
and legal construct. But there is growing documentation in
psychology and sociology that adolescents are uniquely differ-
ent from adults. A substantial body of modem social science
and psychiatry recognizes adolescence as a distinct develop-
mental state in life.' 3 1 Moreover, there is evidence that
juveniles develop in stages-up through adolescence. 3 2
Empirical studies have found, for example, that juveniles differ
from adults in cognitive thought, 3 3 moral development, 3 4 and
129. See Fox, Responsibility in the Juvenile Court, 11 Wm. & MARY L. REv.
659, 660 (1970).
130. See generally P. ARIEs, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SoCIAL
HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE (R. Baldick trans. 1962).
131. See, e.g., J. HAVILAND AND H. SCARBOROUGH, ADOLESCENT
DEVELOPMENT IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (1981); N. SPRINTHALL AND W.
COLLINS, ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY: A DEVELOPMENTAL VIEW (1988).
132. See generally Rogers, Stage Theory and Critical Period as Related to
Adolescence, in ISSUES IN ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY (D. Rogers ed. 1969);
Newman & Newman, Differences Between Childhood and Adulthood: The Identity
Watershed, 23 ADOLESCENCE 551 (1988); E. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY
(1963); Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive and Developmental Approach to
Socialization, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY.AND RESEARCH 347 (D.
Goslin ed. 1969); Kessen, The Concept of "Stages" and "Structure", in READINGS
IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE 23 (W. Meyer ed.
1967).
133. See, e.g., Laursen & Collins, Conceptual Changes During Adolescence and
Effects Upon Parent-Child Relationships, 3 J. ADOLESCENT RES. 119 (1988);
Lockman, Burch, Curry & Lampron, Treatment and Generalization Effects of
Cognitive-Behavioral and Goal Setting Inventions with Aggressive Boys, 52 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 915 (1984).
134. See, e.g., Kohlberg & Kramer, Continuities and Discontinuities in
Childhood and Adult Moral Development, 12 HUM. DEV. 93 (1969); L. KOHLBERG,
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ego development. s" Thus, we believe that age per se should be
a legally relevant variable in any consideration of capacity to
violate the criminal law as well as responsibility for criminal
activity.
Moreover, a consistent body of case law supports the
notion that juveniles, because of their limited maturation, have
diminished culpability. In People v. Wolff,' the California
Supreme Court provides one excellent example of this line of
thinking. In that case, a fifteen-year-old boy killed his mother
and was prosecuted for murder. Upon reviewing Wolff's con-
viction, the Court concluded:
In the case now at bench, in light of the defendant's youth
and undisputed mental illness, all as shown under the
California M'Naghten rule on the trial of the plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity, and properly considered by
the trial judge in the proceeding to determine the degree
of the offense, the true test must include consideration of
the somewhat limited extent to which this defendant
could maturely and meaningfully reflect upon the gravity of
his contemplated act.'" 7
Because this juvenile could not "maturely and meaningfully
reflect upon the gravity of his contemplated act," the Court
reasoned, "the quantum of his moral turpitude and depravity"
was diminished.'3 "
The United State Supreme Court, as well, has expressed
on many occasions the notion that juveniles are to receive spe-
cial consideration because of their status. In 1952, for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court stated that "[c]hildern have a very
special place in life which the law should reflect.""3 9 In Eddings
v. Oklahoma,'" the Court noted that this "special place" has
generally been recognized in the law, evidenced in part by the
fact that every state in the country has a separate juvenile court
THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: MORAL STAGES AND THE IDEA OF
JUSTIcE (1981).
135. See, e.g., Lapsley, Jackson& Rice, Seyf-Monitoring and the "New Look"
at the Imaginary Audience and Personal Fable: An Ego-Developmental Analysis, 3 J.
ADOLESCENT REs. 17 (1988); Ortman, Adolescents' Perceptions of and Feelings
about Control and Responsibility in their Lives, 23 ADOLESCENCE 913 (1988).
136. 61 Cal.2d 795 (1964). For a discussion, see Comment, Keeping
Wo " From the Door: California's Diminished Capacity Concept. 60 CAL. L. REV.
1641 (1972).
137. Id. at 821 (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 822.
139. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1952).
140. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
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system.' 41 The Court also expressed in Eddings that juveniles
possess a lower level of maturity than adults: "Our [American]
history is replete with laws and judicial recognitions that
minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less
mature and responsible than adults.' 4 2 "Even the normal 16-
year-old," the Court noted, "customarily lacks the maturity of
an adult."1
43
The issue of the maturitya-and culpability---of juveniles
surfaced again in Thompson v. Oklahoma. 44 The Court stated:
There is also broad agreement on the proposition that
adolescents as a class are less mature and responsible
than adults. We stressed this difference in explaining the
importance of treating the defendant's youth as.a mitigat-
ing factor in capital cases .... "4 Inexperience, less edu-
cation, and less intelligence make a teenager less able to
evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at
the same time he or she is much more apt to be moti-
vated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult.
The reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the privi-
leges and responsibilities of an adult also explain why
their irresponsible conduct is not as morally responsible
as that of an adult.
146
This logic leads to the conclusion that "less culpability should
attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable
crime by an adult."'1
47
These cases show a longstanding legal tradition and social
recognition that in our society juveniles are different from
adults. They have diminished capacity maturely and meaning-
fully to appreciate the gravity of their acts. Because they have
diminished capacity, they should also have diminished account-
ability for those actions. That means that although they should
be held partially responsible, they should not be held responsi-
ble to the same extent to which adults are held responsible for
similar acts.
To be consistent with the learner's permit theory of ado-
lescence,' 48 and to give the juvenile justice system greater cred-
ibility, it is important to assign juveniles some degree of
141. See iL at 116.
142. Id. at 115-16.
143. Id at 116.
144. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
145. Id at 834.
146. Id at 835.
147. Id
148. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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responsibility for their criminal acts. But this could and should
be done within the context of the juvenile court. A system
based on diminished or partial responsibility implies that the
sanctions would be some fraction or proportion of adult sanc-
tions. The specific quantum of the sanctions would have to be
debated and determined by state legislatures. But this is some-
thing that legislatures have, in some measure, already under-
taken with the juvenile justice reforms. As mentioned earlier in
this article,' 49 many legislatures have recently made age-based
distinctions for imposing more punitive sanctions on older
juveniles who commit serious crimes. These jurisdictions have
begun to institute a system of "graduated responsibility" which
we see as being consistent with adolescent psychology.. More-
over, a juvenile system of procedures and sanctions predicated
on a principle of "graduated responsibilities" would help
bridge the gap between legal theory and adolescent
psychology.
C. The Morality of Double Burdens
1. The Questionable Equality of Youthful and Adult
Offenders
The current policy trend to treat youthful offenders more
punitively raises serious questions about the defensibility of
emerging correctional practices and their differential impact on
these youths when compared with adult offenders and with
nondelinquent youths. Critical attention must be given to poli-
cies that appear to promise greater fairness, equality, and pub-
lic protection by treating youthful offenders like adult
offenders, but have the effect in some cases of imposing more
burdens on youths than on adults, and of subjecting delinquent
youths to higher standards of responsibility than are applied to
youths of similar ages in other situations.
Correctional policies that emphasize criminal responsibil-
ity within the context of the juvenile justice system place youth-
ful offenders in a double bind. These policies treat the minor
as being mature enough to be held responsible for her acts in
the way adult offenders are held responsible. At the same time,
these policies treat the youthful offender as being immature in
her development. She is subjected to differential treatment
because of her immaturity; she is placed in a separate correc-
tional system where she is to complete her moral, educational,
and social training.
149. See text, supra at 628.
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The double bind resulting from the ambivalent legal status
of the youthful offender is particularly evident in the operation
of California's juvenile justice system. The interest in
extending to juveniles the concepts of equal protection of the
law and equal liability for wrongdoing has resulted in imposing
special burdens on the youthful offender. While the features of
the adult Determinate Sentencing Law (DSL) for increasing
prison terms were made available to juvenile court judges, pro-
visions to minimize the severity of the DSL were not equally
extended to juvenile offenders.
For example, under DSL adult defendants are presumed to
be sentenced to the middle (or "base") term of the tripartite
range of prison terms created by the legislature unless aggra-
vating circumstances are proven to warrant the imposition of
the upper term. By contrast, juvenile offenders automatically
receive the maximum or upper term.'5 The DSL also specifies
factors incidental to the offense-for example, causing great
bodily injury to the victim or possessing a firearm-which
judges may use to enhance the prison term for adults. These
factors are equally available to juvenile court judges for
extending the confinement term of the youthful offender. On
the other hand, the DSL provides for good time and work time
credits to all prison inmates which enable adults to reduce their
sentence by up to one-half. Yet the application of this provi-
sion has been expressly denied to juvenile offenders.'" 1 More-
over, juvenile court judges have an additional sanctioning
option that criminal court judges do not have for subjecting
youthful offenders to confinement. A juvenile judge may sen-
tence a youth for confinement at the Youth Authority based on
the entirety of her criminal record, and not simply the adjudi-
cated offense. This option enables the juvenile court judge to
set the confinement term from the most serious offense in the
youth's record-an act for which the youth is likely to have
already been sanctioned through a prior confinement at a local
facility-rather than on the specific offense that precipitated
her disposition to the YA.'5 2
Such sentencing policies for juvenile and adult offenders
in California suggest that youthful offenders are being treated
as equals with adults; yet this "equal" treatment largely facili-
tates the extension of coercive restraints over juveniles. At the
150. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 726.
151. See People v. Reynolds, 116 Cal. App. 3d 141, 171 Cal. Rptr. 461
(1981).
152. See In the Matter of Aaron N., 70 Cal. App. 3d 931, 139 Cal. Rptr.
258 (1977).
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same time, the law has made ajuvenile's youthful status a rele-
vant factor for treating her differently from adults, when to do
so also serves to extend the period of the state's authority.
This differential treatment has been defended out of the desire
to give juvenile authorities maximum flexibility in pursing
treatment goals with their charges. However, in our view this
rationale fails to justify a scheme of differential treatment that
appears to subject juveniles to the worst of the two systems.
2. Standards of Responsibility for Youths
Moreover, whether policies to hold youthful offenders to
the same degree of liability as adults operate as a result of
reforming the goals of the juvenile justice system or of
extending the jurisdiction of the criminal system over youths
previously subject to the juvenile system, they are inconsistent
with standards of maturity and responsibility applied to nonde-
linquent youth. Policies related to the legal regulation of ado-
lescence are premised on a view of youth as a status involving
semi-autonomy and partial maturity. These policies mark the
transition from minority to adulthood by gradually increasing
the opportunities for young people to act independently and to
exercise freedom and judgment. Thus, laws permit youths to
engage in certain activities only when they have reached a mini-
mum age, which varies by the activity and state law. In Califor-
nia, for example, a youth may work part-time at age fifteen,
drive a car or leave school at age sixteen, marry, vote or join
the military at age eighteen, and drink alcohol at age twenty-
one.
The sequential phasing of these and related responsibili-
ties and privileges based on age has been society's major strat-
egy for moving youths towards adulthood and full maturity.'"3
This strategy acknowledges that responsibility and maturity are
not the products of a single event or act, but rather of a process
and a range of experiences. Such phasing regulations are
intended to expose youths to the learning process essential to
developing the ability to make well-reasoned and responsible
decisions. At the same time, these regulations seek to protect
young people from the full consequences of judgments that
reflect their current state of immaturity and inexperience.
Phasing policies allow youths to learn from some mistakes with-
out being held fully responsible for them. Such policies also
require young people to hold off from having to handle some
kinds of mistakes until they have acquired the cognitive or
153. See ZIMRING, supra note 7, at 108.
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emotional strengths to deal with them. For example, in most
jurisdictions, the privilege to drink and the privilege to drive
are not bestowed by the law at the same age because of the
recognition that "the risks generated by learner's mistakes are
exponential when learning to drink and learning to drive are
mixed."'4
In recent years, educational norms and requirements for
employment have had the effect of extending the period of
semi-autonomy, limited responsibility and economic depen-
dence for adolescents. Young people are encouraged to com-
plete high school and obtain college degrees. They are also
discouraged from marrying or beginning families of their own
while still in their teens. They are discouraged from leaving
school to work full-time, especially at jobs offering little oppor-
tunity for advancement or growth. Youths reaching their ado-
lescence in the past two decades are better educated than their
counterparts were thirty or forty years ago. However, they are
facing a world that is technologically, socially, and politically
more complex. It is a world that requires higher levels of skill
and ability. As one observer has noted, in relative terms "kids
have come further, but they have further to go."'155
Policies that hold youthful offenders accountable for their
criminal behavior-based on the view that such behavior is the
product of mature and responsible will-are out of sync with
policies that govern the legal and social status of adolescents
generally. Moreover, these policies run counter to criteria used
to set traditional boundaries for the ending of childhood and
the beginning of adulthood. As Conrad has noted,
[T]he school law defines the child; if he is below the
school leaving age, he should be in school and is there-
fore unready for adult responsibilities .... Below the
school leaving age, a child ordinarily cannot be employed
at an adult occupation regardless of his maturity, regard-
less of whether... he is actually attending school. It fol-
lows that if he cannot work as an adult, he cannot be held
responsible as an adult .... 156
As noted earlier, juvenile justice reforms have created a legal
framework that assigns criminal responsibility to youths based
largely on the commission of an act. Many of the new transfer
laws permit waiver of a youth for criminal processing based on
the seriousness of her offense. Several new juvenile codes
154. 1d at 109.
155. Id at 19.
156. Conrad, Crime and the Child, in MAJOR IssuEs, supra note 37, at 184.
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include punishment and accountability in their statements of
purpose. Such legal frameworks are clearly in conflict with the
strategy of phasing and the theory of adolescence that under-
lies the extension of privileges and burdens to nondelinquent
youths.
The emerging legal framework for juvenile justice with its
punitive policies toward youthful offenders exposes youths to
the full liabilities of their criminal behavior by subjecting them
to the processes and sanctions applicable to adults. At the
same time, the benefits and freedoms of adulthood are not
simultaneously extended. Youths who are transferred to adult
court at age fifteen or sixteen, or who are punished within the
juvenile court but in accordance with adult penalties, do not by
virtue of equal responsibility for their criminal acts earn equal-
ity in other respects. At fifteen, they do not earn the privileges
of dropping out of school, acquiring a license to drive a car or
own a gun, drinking alcohol, and so forth.' 5
As a result of recent reforms, youthful offenders are being
asked to bear the liabilities of the two worlds between which
they stand--childhood with its attendant dependency and
immature judgment but without its protections and nur-
turance-and adulthood with its attendant obligations and
responsibilities, but without its freedoms and independence.
The ambivalence and incongruity in contemporary policies
toward crime and adolescence raise serious ethical questions
for the legal treatment of youthful offenders. The relevant
comparison for measuring fairness, equality, and just deserts in
policies toward youthful offenders has been the treatment of
adult defendants, prisoners, and parolees. While many of the
procedures and sanctions imposed on adult offenders have
been extended to juvenile offenders, the standard of equality
has been limited only to that of bearing equal burdens.
Under revised juvenile codes in many states, the youthful
offender is expected to forfeit the semi-maturity and depen-
157. Interestingly, one might say that the criminal process has the
effect of reducing all convicted persons to the status of adolescence and semi-
maturity in the sense that prisoners, probationers, and parolees are subjected
to supervision and control not associated with the treatment of adults but
rather with the treatment of youths. Their privacy and opportunities to
exercise judgments in matters affecting the quality of their lives and their
happiness are sharply curtailed and scrutinized. Prisoners have no privacy;
like school children, their every movement is regulated. Probationers and
parolees have more independence but they must ask permission to marry,
travel, move, or change jobs, and are subjected to random urine tests and
warrantless searches.
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dency other adolescents her age enjoy. Instead, she acquires,
for purposes of punishment, an adult-like status of full respon-
sibility for her behavior. However, in actuality, the "equal"
burden becomes a heavier burden for the youthful offender.
First, she is held to a standard of maturity and responsibility
higher than that applied to her noncriminal youth counter-
parts. Second, she forgoes, possibly permanently, the period
of semi-responsibility and training for her adult life that her
adult prison inmates once had and her nondelinquent youth
peers continue to have.
Finally, we believe that a class bias has begun to appear in
the consequences of more punitive policies toward youthful
offenders. This bias suggests yet a third type of burden for the
juvenile delinquent. Nondelinquent youths benefit from their
adolescent status .by being able to complete their development
while gradually assuming the burdens and duties of adulthood.
One of the most significant opportunities this affords is that
nondelinquent youths are able to use their status of economic
dependency and semi-responsibility to pursue college educa-
tions. Through their post-secondary educations, they are able
to acquire the intellectual, social, and emotional skills neces-
sary to live satisfying and successful adult lives. Yet, while insti-
tutions of higher learning are accessible, for financial reasons,
largely to middle and upper class families, correctional facilities
are increasingly being filled with black and Hispanic youths
from lower class families."5 8 As a result, youthful offenders-
often poorly educated and socialized to begin with-are falling
further behind other youths in obtaining the skills and experi-
ence necessary for making a successful transition to adult pro-
ductivity and economic self-sufficiency.
VI. CONCLUSION: A CALL FOR MODERATION
The reforms that have taken place in the past 15 years
have, by and large, been beneficial. The time had come to chal-
lenge some of the legal fictions created at the turn of the cen-
tury with the founding of the juvenile court. In the face of
empirical realities and an evolving jurisprudence of youth, it
was time for adjustments in the juvenile justice system. How-
ever, advancing empirical evidence has also reconfirmed the
fundamental premise of the early juvenile reformers: that
158. See I. SCHWARTZ, (IN)JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES: RETHINKING THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 47 (1989) (noting that minority youth now
comprise about 50% of all the juveniles confined in publicly operated
juvenile detention and correctional facilities in the United States).
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juveniles are different from adults. Although the boundary
dividing childhood from adulthood will, of necessity, remain
somewhat arbitrary, we believe that a separate and distinct sta-
tus for juveniles should be maintained, as should the juvenile
court.
Juveniles must assume some measure of responsibility for
their actions. But the responsibility should be graduated,
based on the phasing concept ofjuvenile maturation. Juveniles
should not have to bear the same level of responsibility-or the
same sanctions-as adults. A system of graduated responsibil-
ity and sanctions will not only restore credibility to the juvenile
justice system, it will also be more consistent with current con-
ceptions of adolescent psychology and criminal law doctrine.

